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arXiv Machine Learning By Asif Pinjari, Mithun Paul Saint-Germain

DriftNet: A Dual-Head Trajectory Transformer for Detecting and Localizing Prompt Injection in LLM Agents

Read the original on arXiv Machine Learning →

DriftNet is a dual‑head trajectory Transformer designed to detect and localize prompt injection attacks in large language model agents. It processes logged tool‑call trajectories, classifying each as compromised or not while labeling every step as benign, injection point, hijacked, or failed injection. On the AgentDrift benchmark, DriftNet achieves high accuracy, with an F1 score of 0.983, 98.7% exact injection‑point recovery, and low false‑alarm rates.

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