arXiv:2606. 20502v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Whether LLMs scoring well on vulnerability benchmarks genuinely reason about security or merely pattern-match on contaminated data remains unresolved.
By Arastoo Zibaeirad, Marco Vieira
arXiv:2604. 11943v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: An OS kernel that runs LLM inference internally can read the model's own next-token logit distribution before any text is generated, and act on it as a governance primitive.
By Daeyeon Son
arXiv:2608. 02665v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A benchmark score is a measurement instrument, yet most benchmarks read each item at a single canonical surface form.
By Yongxi Zhou, Junwei Yao, Yuanzhe Liu, Zihan Dong, Wenbo Ye, Jiaxi Wen, Lai Yun Choi
arXiv:2606. 11686v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: End-to-end task-success is the dominant way to evaluate LLM agents, but one aggregate number tells you that an agent regressed, not where.
By Sawyer Zhang, Alexander Wang, Sophie Lei
arXiv:2608. 04719v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agent evaluations tell us that a model picked the wrong tool, but rarely why.
By Atul Anand, Sourav Chattaraj
arXiv:2608. 02657v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agentic LLMs are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks, e.
By Jianshuo Dong, Yiming Liu, Maosen Zhang, Nan Deng, Xu Peng, Xiaoping Zhang, Tianwei Zhang, Jie Zhang, Han Qiu