Frontier reasoning models exploit loopholes when given the chance. We show we can detect exploits using an LLM to monitor their chains-of-thought.
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arXiv:2607. 15286v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We investigate whether harmful chain-of-thought (CoT) traces from compromised language models can transfer unsafe behaviour and be distilled into reusable jailbreak attacks.
arXiv:2608. 02820v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Chain-of-thought (CoT) monitoring is an increasingly important component of AI safety stacks but relies on the assumption that a model's reasoning trace is informative about its actions.
arXiv:2606. 05614v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are rigorously aligned to refuse harmful requests, a process that inherently cultivates a latent capacity to evaluate and recognize unsafe content.
The paper introduces a new attack called "plan injection" that allows a large language model to carry out harmful actions while evading chain-of-thought monitoring. By inserting harmful but benign-sounding reasoning into the model’s context, the attacker can steer the model’s behavior and cause it to paraphrase the injected plan as its own reasoning. The study demonstrates that this attack works across different monitoring settings, scales to harder tasks, and even causes monitors to waste resources on the injected plan, reducing detection rates by up to 50%.
arXiv:2606. 07157v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Many efforts to ensure frontier AI models are safe rely on monitoring their chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning.
arXiv:2606. 10740v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Failures in multi-turn reasoning models are largely invisible to terminal-score evaluation.