arXiv:2607. 15286v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We investigate whether harmful chain-of-thought (CoT) traces from compromised language models can transfer unsafe behaviour and be distilled into reusable jailbreak attacks.
Summary generated by The Flow from the publisher's feed. The full article lives at arXiv Machine Learning.
arXiv:2607. 23496v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety-aligned large language models are trained to refuse harmful requests, yet embedding the same requests in particular scenarios can bypass their safeguards.
Safety-aligned large language models are trained to refuse harmful requests, yet embedding the same requests in particular scenarios can bypass their safeguards. Existing red-teaming methods empirically identify effective scenarios through observed attack outcomes, but why particular scenarios weaken refusal remains mechanistically unclear.
arXiv:2608. 02820v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Chain-of-thought (CoT) monitoring is an increasingly important component of AI safety stacks but relies on the assumption that a model's reasoning trace is informative about its actions.
arXiv:2605. 00123v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Safety trained large language models (LLMs) can often be induced to answer harmful requests through jailbreak prompts.
arXiv:2607. 00481v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Jailbreak attacks remain a critical threat to the safe deployment of large language models (LLMs).
arXiv:2606. 05614v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are rigorously aligned to refuse harmful requests, a process that inherently cultivates a latent capacity to evaluate and recognize unsafe content.