Combining Long-Term Memory and LLMs Comes at a High Cost: From Prompt Injection to Persistent Compromise
Read the original on arXiv Machine Learning →The paper investigates a new vulnerability called memory injection, where malicious prompts can persist across sessions in modern LLM‑as‑a‑service platforms. By demonstrating that all NIST attack goals can be achieved on ChatGPT Instant 5.3, Claude Sonnet 4.6, and Gemini 3 Flash, the authors show that these services can spread disinformation, generate harmful content, or cause offline unresponsiveness even in fresh sessions. The study also reveals that many proposed defenses are not yet implemented and provides datasets and artifacts for further research.
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