arXiv Machine Learning By Pedro H. Barcha Correia, Matheus Azevedo de S\'a, Paulo H. Gomes de Senna, Giovanni Mandel Martignago, Victor Takashi Hayashi, Charles Christian Miers, Marcos A. Simplicio Jr

Combining Long-Term Memory and LLMs Comes at a High Cost: From Prompt Injection to Persistent Compromise

Read the original on arXiv Machine Learning →

The paper investigates a new vulnerability called memory injection, where malicious prompts can persist across sessions in modern LLM‑as‑a‑service platforms. By demonstrating that all NIST attack goals can be achieved on ChatGPT Instant 5.3, Claude Sonnet 4.6, and Gemini 3 Flash, the authors show that these services can spread disinformation, generate harmful content, or cause offline unresponsiveness even in fresh sessions. The study also reveals that many proposed defenses are not yet implemented and provides datasets and artifacts for further research.

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arXiv AI
Jun 4

What If Prompt Injection Never Left? Exploring Cross-Session Stored Prompt Injection in Agentic Systems

arXiv:2606. 04425v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Modern agentic systems transform LLMs from session-bounded assistants into stateful systems that persist and evolve shared world state across sessions through memories, filesystems, tools, and other long-lived contextual artifacts.

By Yuanbo Xie, Tianyun Liu, Yingjie Zhang, Suchen Liu, Yulin Li, Liya Su, Tingwen Liu