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arXiv Machine Learning By Soumita Chatterjee, Sudip Ghosh, Tamal Ghosh, Bhargab B. Bhattacharya, Hafizur Rahaman

Combinatorial Lock for Trojan-Resilient AI Engines via Hash-Assisted Spectral Filtering

Read the original on arXiv Machine Learning →

The paper introduces Combinatorial Lock, a training‑free, hardware‑friendly defense against multi‑trigger backdoor attacks in AI models. It transforms multi‑trigger detection into a combinatorial problem over binary activation signatures, using anomaly‑gated spectral scrubbing and hash‑compressed signatures verified by expert ensembles. Experiments on six popular architectures show the method reduces attack success rates to 0.1% while maintaining 97.8% clean accuracy, with modest latency overhead on ASIC and FPGA platforms.

Machine-generated by The Flow from the publisher's headline and feed description — not written or checked by a human. The full article lives at arXiv Machine Learning.

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