How can we evaluate whether frontier AI systems recognize child-safety risks before they escalate into explicit harm? Existing child safety evaluations focus on child sexual abuse material, yet many child-safety failures begin earlier: in model assistance that helps adults manipulate, impersonate, profile, or isolate minors, and in model responses that deepen children's emotional dependence on AI systems rather than redirecting them toward human support.
arXiv:2606. 04867v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As AI companion platforms such as Replika and Character.
By Yanjing Ren, Reza Ebrahimi, TengTeng Ma
arXiv:2606. 08044v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large Language Model (LLM) safety has often been evaluated at the behavior level, which provides limited evidence of internal robustness, as these evaluations target outputs rather than representation-level vulnerability under intervention.
By Enyi Jiang, Anders Gj{\o}lbye, Yibo Jacky Zhang, Sanmi Koyejo
arXiv:2607. 05407v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Modern artificial intelligence (AI) systems present profound new risks to child safety.
By Neil Kale, Rebecca Portnoff, Pratiksha Thaker, Michael Simpson, Robertson Wang, Kevin Kuo, Chhavi Yadav, Virginia Smith
arXiv:2608. 14577v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Frontier large language models (LLMs) safety evaluation has largely treated harmful generation as an attack outcome rather than as an object of analysis.
By Zhouyuan Ma, Yutao Wu, Hanxun Huang, Xiang Zheng, Xiao Liu, Yixin Cao, Zuxuan Wu, Xingjun Ma, Yu-Gang Jiang
arXiv:2608. 05086v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Language models differ in how safely they behave and these differences are measured by safety benchmarks.
By Joshua Fonseca Rivera (Independent), Neil Shah (Independent), David Demitri Africa (UK AI Security Institute), Konstantinos Voudouris (UK AI Security Institute)