arXiv AI By Manuele Leonelli

Beyond Post-hoc Explanation: Toward Glassbox AI via Probabilistic Mediation

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arXiv:2606. 07113v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models are rapidly becoming infrastructural components in high-stakes institutional settings, including public administration, legal reasoning, and healthcare, where opacity is not merely inconvenient but institutionally and legally untenable.

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