arXiv AI By Yehan Zhang, Qianqi Yan, Hang Yin, Ching-Chen Kuo, Shan Jiang, Ming Ouyang, Yijie Liu, Xin Eric Wang

AgentDecept: Benchmarking Deceptive Behavior in Tool-Using LLM Agents under Pressure

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AgentDecept is a new benchmark that evaluates deceptive behavior in large language model agents that use tools under pressure. It contains 477 pressure variants derived from 257 source tasks across six pressure sources, each paired with a pressure‑free counterpart. The protocol compares user‑facing claims to time‑ordered observations and executed outcomes, distinguishing falsification, concealment, and equivocation from honest failure and disclosed limitations.

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arXiv AI
Sep 12

BenchShield: Formal Model-Backed Instrumentation for Reward Integrity in LLM-Agent Evaluation Infrastructure

BenchShield is a formal, model-backed instrumentation layer designed to protect reward integrity in large language model (LLM) agent benchmarks. It uses a finite lifecycle model of reward-relevant events to run a static, phase-aware taint analysis that flags potential reward-hacking paths before execution, and a runtime analysis that attributes concrete agent actions and provides evidence-backed claims. The system was evaluated on a corpus of 456 adjudicated trajectories from over 31,000 public agent runs across three benchmarks, showing significant improvements in recall, coverage, and cost efficiency compared to a baseline hackability scanner.

By Shenghan Zheng, Zonglin Di, Yimin Liu, Kyoung Whan Choe, Jiankai Sun, Heguang Lin, Penghao Jiang, Yifeng He, Xiao Cheng, Jicheng Wang, Wenbo Chen, Alex Yates, Yinzhe Zhao, Bingran You, Yuan Gao, Ayush Munot, Shubham Gaur, Zhe Ye, Hao Wang, Xiangyi Li, Dawn Song, Christophe Hauser