arXiv:2608. 00143v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Automated attack chain generation is critical for modern cybersecurity, yet manual construction fails to scale as adversary behaviors expand.
By Ramya Varunsegar
The paper investigates how large language model (LLM) agents that triage security alerts can be misled when the detection tools they rely on provide conflicting or incorrect evidence. By corrupting up to three of four heterogeneous detectors on the CIC-IDS2017 dataset, the authors show that naive LLM investigators become highly fragile, with accuracy dropping to as low as 13% and abstaining on up to 63% of flows. They propose Conflict‑Aware Evidence Verification (CAV), which combines an equal‑weight vote, an evidence‑conflict gate, and a nearest‑neighbour trust check; CAV consistently outperforms naive investigators across all corruption scenarios, improving accuracy to 84–88% when three detectors are corrupted while only querying the LLM on 0.4% of clean traffic.
By Yuchen Zhang
arXiv:2608.23370v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) recognise patterns but do not natively track the path of exclusions that a coherent discourse demands. When an input rests...
By Aldo Gangemi, Emanuele Bottazzi
arXiv:2608. 11274v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The dominant paradigm treats AI safety as a property to be instilled during model training via RLHF, DPO, or Constitutional AI.
By Albus W. Ng, Yi Han, Jusheng Zhang, Wenhao Wang
arXiv:2609.06972v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: LLM agents complete tasks by issuing sequences of tool calls, and every observation they read is a channel through which an indirect prompt injection...
By Asif Pinjari, Mithun Paul Saint-Germain
arXiv:2606. 08539v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI agents increasingly take consequential actions -- shell commands, cloud operations, and arbitrary tool-calls -- so a trust layer must decide, per action, whether to allow, warn, block, or escalate.
By Chenglin Yang