Adversarially Attacking Symbolic Vocabulary Vulnerabilities In LLM Planners
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arXiv:2606. 01441v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) excel in reasoning and knowledge-intensive tasks but remain vulnerable to prompt-level adversarial attacks that preserve intent while triggering commonsense hallucinations.
arXiv:2508.01300v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: AI planning provides agents the ability to act autonomously towards achieving a goal in a given environment. Recent advances in Large Language Mode...
The paper introduces OverThink, a slowdown attack that forces reasoning language models (RLMs) to produce many more reasoning tokens while still giving correct answers. By injecting decoy reasoning problems—such as Markov decision processes, language translation, or graphic comprehension—into the model’s context, attackers can dramatically increase token generation (up to 46× on SQuAD and 17× on coding agents). The study evaluates the attack on both proprietary and open-source RLMs across multiple datasets, explores multimodal and coding‑agent variants, and tests several defenses, concluding that defending against OverThink is challenging and that newer RLMs are even more vulnerable due to higher per‑token costs and increased reasoning token usage.
The paper introduces the concept of semantic deception, where unfamiliar symbols are used to mislead large language models (LLMs) during simple arithmetic tasks. By redefining digits and operators with novel symbols, the authors test whether LLMs can abstract and manipulate arbitrary symbol systems or fall back on learned semantic associations. Experiments with four LLMs show that misleading semantic cues significantly degrade performance, revealing a reliance on surface-level semantics that can undermine symbolic reasoning.
The paper proposes universal, tool‑based defenses for large language model agents that use external tools, addressing four types of adversarial attacks: direct and indirect prompt injection, memory poisoning, and backdoor attacks. Two main defenses are introduced: Attacker Tool Filtering, which uses anomaly detection to remove suspicious tools, and Normal Tool Recalling, which restores the agent’s original toolset before planning. The authors also add prompt‑based defenses such as Chain‑of‑Thought prompting and self‑reflection, and demonstrate that these methods dramatically lower attack success rates—often to 0%—across multiple open‑source and proprietary LLMs while maintaining or improving task performance.
arXiv:2606. 27757v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) have attracted widespread attention from academia and industry, yet their deployment raises critical security concerns regarding robustness and reliability.