arXiv AI By Samuele Poppi, Nils Lukas

A Gravitational Interpretation of Fine-Tuning Reversion

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arXiv:2606. 28525v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Fine-tuning on harmless data can partially undo behaviors acquired earlier in training.

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