arXiv:2606. 15903v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Where an LLM sits in an agent memory pipeline -- between the recall plane that retrieves stored facts (extensively benchmarked) and the control plane that mutates them via supersede, release, purge (largely untested) -- shapes which forgetting failure modes the system recovers.
arXiv:2607.27836v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large language model unlearning is consistently fragile under relearn attacks. On TOFU, fine-tuning on twenty forget examples substantially recover...
arXiv:2601. 18699v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Sequential fine-tuning of Large Language Models (LLMs) adaptation to target tasks often triggers catastrophic forgetting, where the acquisition of novel target skills degrades ancestral capabilities.
arXiv:2606. 20502v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Whether LLMs scoring well on vulnerability benchmarks genuinely reason about security or merely pattern-match on contaminated data remains unresolved.
arXiv:2608.21606v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Machine unlearning aims to remove the influence of targeted training data from a model while preserving its remaining capabilities, but evaluating whet...
arXiv:2608.20873v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Every way of teaching a deployed language model something new -- full fine-tuning, adapter merging, model editing -- replaces the released checkpoint,...
arXiv:2607. 02513v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLMs memorize sensitive training data, including personally identifiable information (PII), creating a pressing need for reliable post hoc removal methods.
arXiv:2609.16229v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Machine unlearning aims to remove specific knowledge from a trained large language model (LLM) without retraining from scratch. Existing methods modify...
arXiv:2512. 14751v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Finetuning pretrained large language models (LLMs) has become the standard paradigm for developing downstream applications.
arXiv:2607. 06503v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents solving multi-step tasks frequently commit to trajectories that are doomed to fail, yet continue to consume substantial inference compute before the failure becomes observable.
arXiv:2606. 00738v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Adversarial Training (AT) is a leading defense against adversarial examples but often suffers from Catastrophic Overfitting (CO) in efficient single-step variants, where robustness to multi-step attacks collapses despite high single-step performance.
The paper investigates whether a model that has undergone class unlearning can still recover forgotten classes without access to original data. It introduces a white‑box audit method that generates synthetic probes in representation space, filters them by confidence, and relabels boundary‑adjacent probes as the forgotten class. The authors define a Relearning Score to quantify recovery while preserving retain performance, and demonstrate that several unlearning techniques on CIFAR‑10, CIFAR‑100, and TinyImageNet can be fully recovered in a source‑free setting, sometimes even outperforming a retrained reference.