arXiv:2609.38270v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Advancing beyond traditional static scoring models, LLM-powered agentic recommender systems (LLM-ARS) instantiate users and items as autonomous agent...
By Yurong Hao, Wen Zhou, Guowei Guan, Tiantong Wu, Fuyao Zhang, Wei Yang Bryan Lim
arXiv:2603. 15727v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Autonomous LLM-based agents increasingly operate as long-running processes forming densely interconnected multi-agent ecosystems, whose security properties remain largely unexplored.
By Yihao Zhang, Zeming Wei, Xiaokun Luan, Chengcan Wu, Zhixin Zhang, Jiangrong Wu, Haolin Wu, Huanran Chen, Jun Sun, Meng Sun
arXiv:2608. 10218v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI agents are becoming more autonomous and increasingly interconnected, exposing them to new emergent risks arising from agent-to-agent interaction.
By Vassilis Papadopoulos, McNair Shah, Sam Zimmerman, Jack Lindsey
arXiv:2606. 03811v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A computer worm is malware that spreads on a network by replicating itself from one machine to another.
By Jonas Guan, Tom Blanchard, Hanna Foerster, Hengrui Jia, Gabriel Huang, Nicolas Papernot
arXiv:2605. 01133v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM)-powered multi-agent systems (MAS) enable agents to communicate and share information, achieving strong performance on complex tasks.
By Lingxi Zhang, Guangtao Zheng, Hanjie Chen
The paper introduces the Generic Multi-Agent Trading System (GMATS), a framework for studying how large language model (LLM) based trading stacks react to black-box, input-only attacks that inject plausible social‑media content. It defines contagion metrics—belief‑shift scores at analyst and coordinator layers and attack‑clean deltas on backtest metrics—to trace the spread of adversarial signals. Experiments on a safe offline benchmark show that even simple attackers can significantly degrade risk‑return profiles, while certain multi‑agent topologies and coordinator prompts can mitigate these effects.
By Qi Rong Sua, Junhao Dong, Nguyen Duc Thai, Yuqing Wen, Cheston Tan, Yew-Soon Ong
arXiv:2608.22061v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Personal AI agents routinely consume external content while performing tasks such as web browsing, email processing, and SNS feed summarization, and th...
By Minjae Seo, Wonwoo Choi, Geonwoo Han, Taekyoung Kwon, Yongsu Kim, Sang Seo, Jaewon Noh, Hankyul Baek, Seongyun Seo, Myoungsung You
arXiv:2607. 07903v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) exhibit remarkable capabilities but remain highly vulnerable to adversarial prompts and jailbreak attacks.
By Anupam Wagle, Ifrat Ikhtear Uddin, Chaowei Zhang, Longwei Wang
arXiv:2607. 06807v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: While enabling effective collaboration on complex tasks, LLM-based Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) face critical security challenges due to vulnerabilities at the agent and interaction levels.
By Haowen Xu, Xue Tan, Lei Ma, Zhihao Zhang, Chao Wang, Qingze Wang, Ping Chen, Jun Dai, Xiaoyan Sun
arXiv:2508. 16481v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Ensuring the safe use of agentic systems requires a thorough understanding of the range of malicious behaviors these systems may exhibit.
By Jonathan N\"other, Adish Singla, Goran Radanovic
The paper investigates how adversarial signals can infiltrate large‑language‑model (LLM) based multi‑agent trading systems through the agents’ communication channels. By restricting the attacker to realistic inputs—source data and prompts—it studies role‑specific attacks on four functional roles (Analyst, Researcher, Trader, Risk Manager) and evaluates four communication topologies under data‑ and agent‑level attacks. Experiments across multiple assets, backbones, and target directions show that no architecture is inherently robust, highlighting the need for safer designs in agentic trading systems.
By CheolWon Na, Hao Ni, Lukasz Szpruch, Zhangyang Wang, Dhagash Mehta, Saurabh Nagrecha, Alejandro Lopez-Lira, Chanyeol Choi, Yongjae Lee, Jee-Hyong Lee
The paper proposes an epidemic model to explain how a multi‑agent system can shift from a single accidental deviation to a collective loss of control. It identifies accidental mutation, contagion through communication, and recovery as key mechanisms, and demonstrates that unsafe trajectories can spread rapidly among agents, leading to high harm rates in injected scenarios. The study also highlights the importance of auditing communication paths and strengthening both prevention and recovery measures to mitigate such risks.
By Xiangfan Wu, Zonghao Ying, Huiyu Wu, Xing Zheng, Huangsheng Cheng, Xiaorong Shi, Jing Guo