arXiv:2606. 12797v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agentic large language model systems that autonomously invoke tools, maintain persistent memory, and execute multi-step plans are increasingly deployed in public-facing domains, including government services, healthcare triage, and financial advising.
By Md Jafrin Hossain, Mohammad Arif Hossain, Weiqi Liu, Nirwan Ansari
arXiv:2607. 20488v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Multi-agent LLM frameworks typically fix their team topology at boot time.
By Bronislav Sidik, Chaya Levi, Nizzan Kimhi
arXiv:2605. 17909v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: As autonomous agentic systems scale across regulated critical infrastructures, the lack of mechanistic, hardware-rooted enforcement for high-frequency policy updates presents a fundamental safety gap.
By Riddhi Mohan Sharma
arXiv:2607. 14309v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The rapid development of Large Language Models (LLMs) and Artificial Intelligent (AI) powered autonomous agents has fundamentally changed the existing forms of software governance.
By Nutan Kumar Naik, Aditya Kumar Saroj, Vijay Prasad Poudel, Saurav Samantray, Abhishek Patel
arXiv:2608. 15127v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agentic applications are shifting AI serving from isolated model inference to long-running workloads in which LLMs coordinate tools, environments, and persistent state.
By Chaokun Chang, Yukun Zhou, Kaihua Fu, Dakai An, Tianyu Feng, Hanfeng Lu, Sheng Yao, Pu Guo, Yinghao Yu, Yizhou Shan, Bo Li, Binhang Yuan, Wei Wang
The paper proposes a contract‑centered architecture for agentic runtimes, defining four shared responsibility objects—Skill, Harness, Scaffold, and an external data substrate—to manage capabilities, runtime, control boundaries, and data governance in enterprise AI deployments. It introduces a falsifiable hypothesis (P1) about cost‑aware capability‑capacity separability and outlines six measurable design conditions, proposing a cluster‑period randomized crossover experiment to test the hypothesis. The work presents a contract‑bounded runtime architecture, a source‑preserving data substrate, and a measurement protocol, though no implementation or empirical results are reported.
By Yaxiao Liu, Pengbo Liu, Yiwen Liu, Yihua Guan, Zhenghe Hou, Jiaxing Song
arXiv:2609.37457v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Enterprise artificial-intelligence agents increasingly call tools, modify infrastructure, and process protected data, creating a need to separate actio...
By Kabeh Mohsenzadegan, Vahid Tavakkoli, Kyandoghere Kyamakya
Large language model (LLM) agents are evolving from request-response assistants into long-running software actors: they maintain state across model calls, fork subtasks, wait for external events, request human authority, generate tools, and perform side effects that must be resumed and audited. This paper presents Agent libOS, a library-OS-inspired runtime substrate for LLM agents.
arXiv:2602. 09345v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: AI agents are increasingly deployed in multi-tenant cloud environments, where they execute diverse tool calls within sandboxed containers, each call with distinct resource demands and rapid fluctuations.
By Yusheng Zheng, Jiakun Fan, Quanzhi Fu, Yiwei Yang, Wei Zhang, Andi Quinn
arXiv:2605. 27898v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: As LLMs are increasingly deployed as agents, reliable assessment of their agentic capabilities has become essential.
By Pengyu Zhu, Lijun Li, Yaxing Lyu, Qianxin Luo, Jingyi Yang, Yi Liu, Tingfeng Hui, Xinyu Yuan, Li Sun, Sen Su, Jing Shao
arXiv:2608.21393v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Running large language models inside enterprise environments has always bumped up against a practical wall: the data lives in one place, the AI horsepo...
By Sandeep Bokkasam, Pankaj D
AgentKernel proposes a trust‑native operating system for AI agents, arguing that current governance layers are insufficient because they share the same process trust boundary as the agents. The OS introduces a mandatory enforcement boundary organized into four pillars—Identity, Perception, Cognition, and Execution—each adapting classical OS security principles to address semantic‑level failures such as prompt injection, memory poisoning, and tool misuse. By wrapping the agent lifecycle in this structured, non‑bypassable framework, AgentKernel aims to provide a unified security layer that can enforce identity, input mediation, memory governance, and execution control across the entire agent lifecycle.
By Zhenhua Zou, Sheng Guo, Qiuyang Zhan, Lepeng Zhao, Shuo Li, Zhuotao Liu