arXiv:2606. 19149v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Automated vulnerability discovery in large codebases remains challenging: traditional static analysis produces high false-positive rates, while dynamic approaches such as fuzzing require substantial infrastructure and often target narrow classes of bugs.
By Nahum Korda, Gadi Evron
arXiv:2602. 04894v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: LLMs are increasingly used for code generation, but their outputs often follow recurring templates that can induce predictable vulnerabilities.
By Tomer Kordonsky, Amit LeVi, Maayan Yamin, Noam Benzimra, Avi Mendelson
The paper introduces DUALLM, a dual-method pipeline that uses a Large Language Model and a fine‑tuned small language model to classify Linux kernel security patches with high precision. By analyzing commit titles, messages, diffs, and code context, DUALLM achieves 87.4% accuracy and an F1‑score of 0.875, outperforming existing methods. It successfully identified 111 recent patches addressing out‑of‑bounds or use‑after‑free vulnerabilities, with 90 confirmed true positives and proof‑of‑concept exploits demonstrating the validity of the classifications.
By Xingyu Li (UC Riverside), Juefei Pu (UC Riverside), Yifan Wu (UC Riverside), Xiaochen Zou (UC Riverside), Shitong Zhu (UC Riverside), Qiushi Wu (UC Riverside), Zheng Zhang (UC Riverside), Joshua Hsu (UC Riverside), Yue Dong (UC Riverside), Zhiyun Qian (UC Riverside), Kangjie Lu (UC Riverside), Trent Jaeger (UC Riverside), Michael De Lucia (UC Riverside), Srikanth V. Krishnamurthy (UC Riverside)
The paper introduces Porting Benchmark, a curated dataset of 1,234 security patch backporting cases that span cross-version, cross-branch, and cross-repository scenarios, along with a common evaluation framework. Five tools—spanning program analysis, LLM prompting, and LLM agents—are evaluated under aligned settings, revealing that performance varies significantly across tools and that complex patches (Type-IV) see a sharp drop in success rate. The study identifies four root-cause categories for failures and demonstrates that reference-based benchmark scores may not fully capture real-world remediation, as executable validation uncovers additional integration issues.
By Jincheng Yang, Yulong Fu, Chengwei Liu, Lyuye Zhang, Fangyuan Zhang, Bingyang Ren, Yang Liu, Hui Li
arXiv:2609.08040v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: The software supply chain has become an increasingly exposed attack surface because of its reliance on intricate yet fragile dependencies. Existing d...
By Jiahao Shi, Edward Tsien, Yifeng Di, Hongjiao Zhang, Yuan Tang, Ronit Dey, Ilona Shishov, Gal Netanel, Zvi Grinberg, Vladimir Belousov, Bat-Zion Rotman, Ilan Pinto, Tianyi Zhang
arXiv:2608. 12246v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Evaluating security vulnerability detection tools requires benchmark datasets with vulnerability-inducing commits (VICs) - the commits that first introduce vulnerabilities into codebases.
By Jin Lu, Xuening Han, Yang Zhong, Lin Tan, Kevin Luo, Andrew Gacek, Neha Rungta
arXiv:2605. 13138v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Automated detection of vulnerability-fixing commits (\vfcs) is critical for timely security patch deployment, as advisory databases lag patch releases by a median of 25 days and many fixes never receive advisories.
By Nils Loose, Joseph Bienh\"uls, Kristoffer Hempel, Felix M\"achtle, Thomas Eisenbarth
arXiv:2606. 04739v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) have shown strong potential for automated software vulnerability detection, particularly in retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) settings.
By Sabrina Kaniewski, Fabian Schmidt, Tobias Heer
The paper introduces BUGSTONE‑E2E, a framework that converts vulnerability history into executable detection rules and validates them. It mines reusable rules from fixing commits, organizes them by CWE and language, and applies a funnel‑shaped pipeline that starts with lightweight analysis and culminates in LLM‑guided inspection, runtime verification, and patch generation. Using 19,325 high‑severity CVEs, the system identified 2,710 fixing commits, created 1,033 detection rules across 56 CWE families, and produced runtime evidence for 644 findings in 14 programs.
By Qiushi Wu, Kevin Eykholt, Youngja Park, Xiaokui Shu, Dhilung Kirat, Douglas Lee Schales, Ian Molloy
The paper introduces Porting Benchmark, a dataset of 1,234 security patch backporting cases covering cross-version, cross-branch, and cross-repository scenarios, along with a unified evaluation framework. Five tools—spanning program analysis, LLM prompting, and LLM agents—are evaluated under aligned settings, revealing that performance varies significantly across tools and patch complexity, with success rates dropping sharply for structurally complex patches. The study identifies four root-cause categories for failures and demonstrates that reference-based benchmark scores may not fully reflect real-world remediation, as executable validation uncovers additional integration issues.
arXiv:2609.37669v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) is increasingly used to enhance Large Language Model (LLM)-based software vulnerability detection by grounding p...
By Sabrina Kaniewski, Tim Kr\"amer, Julius B\"achle, Markus Enzweiler, Michael Menth, Tobias Heer
arXiv:2606. 15123v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We study the task of CVE-conditioned exploit generation, where a model drafts proof-of-concept (PoC) exploits given software vulnerability context.
By Yiwei Chen, Lichi Li, Kai Cheung, Vinny Parla, Ganesh Sundaram