Geometric Data Perturbation (GDP) allows participants to share distance‑preserving transformations of their private data for one‑shot collaborative learning. The paper examines the vulnerability when an analyst colludes with participants, showing that shared‑anchor alignment can restore compatibility but also enables exact data recovery. To mitigate this, the authors propose adding noise to the anchor representations rather than the private data, demonstrating through experiments on MNIST and CelebA that this approach yields better privacy‑utility trade‑offs under collusion.
arXiv:2606. 04399v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: In the paradigm of decentralized learning, a group of agents collaborate to train a global model using distributed datasets without a central server.
arXiv:2606. 10595v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Federated Learning (FL) has emerged as a promising solution for data hunger in centralized learning.
arXiv:2606. 00986v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Federated learning (FL) enables multiple data holders to train machine learning models collaboratively without centralizing raw data, making it useful in privacy sensitive domains such as healthcare and institutional data sharing.
arXiv:2502. 17748v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Federated Learning (FL) inherently mitigates mass data centralization risks; however, its privacy protections are not equally distributed - leaving vulnerable individuals disproportionately exposed to sophisticated privacy attacks.
arXiv:2409. 01062v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Model Inversion (MI) attacks pose a significant privacy threat by reconstructing private training data from machine learning models.
arXiv:2512. 12840v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Vertical Federated Learning (VFL) enables collaborative model training across organizations that share common user samples but hold disjoint feature spaces.
arXiv:2509. 10691v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Decentralized federated learning enables collaborative model training without a central server, but shared model updates can still leak sensitive information through inversion, reconstruction, and membership inference attacks.
Heterogeneous Differential Privacy (HDP) in Federated Learning (FL) allows clients to select individual privacy budgets ($\varepsilon_i$) according to institutional policies and data sensitivity. In practice, many HDP-FL systems employ $\varepsilon$-aware server aggregation to improve model utility by re-weighting client updates according to their declared privacy budgets.
arXiv:2503. 10945v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Current practices for reporting differential privacy (DP) guarantees for machine learning (ML) algorithms such as DP-SGD provide an incomplete and potentially misleading picture.
arXiv:2606. 08372v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Synthetic data is increasingly promoted as a privacy-preserving substitute for releasing sensitive tabular records, yet its central adversarial threat ("reconstruction", the recovery of an individual's hidden attribute values from a synthetic release and a handful of known quasi-identifiers) has been studied only in scattered, hard-to-compare settings.
arXiv:2606. 02563v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Heterogeneous Differential Privacy (HDP) in Federated Learning (FL) allows clients to select individual privacy budgets ($\varepsilon_i$) according to institutional policies and data sensitivity.
arXiv:2606. 08027v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Vertical federated learning (VFL) is a distributed learning paradigm that leverages vertically partitioned features across isolated parties without sharing raw samples; however, it remains vulnerable to active sample reconstruction attacks.