arXiv:2506. 19260v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Federated learning transmits only model updates to protect client data, and differentially private SGD (DP-SGD) bounds content-level leakage through those updates.
arXiv:2606. 02563v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Heterogeneous Differential Privacy (HDP) in Federated Learning (FL) allows clients to select individual privacy budgets ($\varepsilon_i$) according to institutional policies and data sensitivity.
The paper introduces Fulcrum, a topology‑aware differential privacy scheme for hierarchical federated learning that allocates noise based on the size and exposure of regional aggregation groups. By deriving a closed‑form exposure dispersion metric from region structure and weights, the method optimally balances privacy and utility, achieving up to 14.84% accuracy gains on image tasks and 12.16% on text tasks at ε = 0.99 compared to uniform noise allocation. The approach ensures each participant receives noise commensurate with its actual exposure, eliminating unnecessary privacy overhead.
Heterogeneous Differential Privacy (HDP) in Federated Learning (FL) allows clients to select individual privacy budgets ($\varepsilon_i$) according to institutional policies and data sensitivity. In practice, many HDP-FL systems employ $\varepsilon$-aware server aggregation to improve model utility by re-weighting client updates according to their declared privacy budgets.
The paper introduces FGLGuard, a privacy‑preserving federated graph learning framework that trains a graph attention detector on each operator’s own multi‑agent system (MAS) episode graphs, sharing only model updates. By combining a proximal local objective, domain‑balanced aggregation, threshold calibration, and guarded rewrite mechanisms, FGLGuard adapts to non‑IID data across organizations and outperforms centralized and local‑only baselines on Agent‑SafetyBench, R‑Judge, and AgentDojo. The method achieves significant reductions in attack success rates—up to 43% on AgentDojo—without compromising utility, API cost, or model capability.
arXiv:2606. 16763v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: When a person's records appear in k independent data silos, each protected by (epsilon, delta)-differential privacy, standard composition yields a valid (k*epsilon, k*delta)-DP guarantee for the joint output.
arXiv:2606. 04399v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: In the paradigm of decentralized learning, a group of agents collaborate to train a global model using distributed datasets without a central server.
arXiv:2512. 04668v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Graph topology is a fundamental determinant of memory leakage in multi-agent LLM systems, yet its effects remain poorly quantified.
The paper investigates how privacy guarantees, robustness to Byzantine attacks, and detection coverage for rare intrusion types interact in federated network intrusion detection systems. It introduces geometric indistinguishability to explain how privacy noise can obscure minority-class signals, and demonstrates through experiments on UNSW‑NB15 that combining differential privacy with robust aggregation can disproportionately harm detection of rare attacks. The study highlights that these properties cannot be treated as independently composable and calls for aggregation‑aware modeling and sample‑aware evaluation to build trustworthy federated NIDS.
The paper investigates how federated learning (FL) updates in vehicular edge networks can reveal client identities through gradient-based attacks on inertial sensor data, using the UCI Human Activity Recognition benchmark as a proxy. Experiments show that an honest-but-curious server can identify clients with near-perfect accuracy from unprotected updates. The authors evaluate lightweight defenses—clipping followed by Gaussian noise and ensemble FL—to mitigate this privacy risk while preserving model utility, reporting differential‑privacy budgets and empirical results across multiple attack classifiers and data partitions.
arXiv:2606. 17035v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Prior research suggests that differential privacy (DP) inherently enhances the robustness of federated learning (FL) against backdoor attacks.
arXiv:2601. 17360v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: An adversary observing a model's released prediction can infer sensitive attributes of the queried input, or even reconstruct representatives of the model's training data.
arXiv:2607. 07314v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Federated learning (FL) avoids explicit data exposure by keeping raw data on local clients, yet privacy risks remain in the training process and the learned model itself.