arXiv AI

ChatGPT as a Surveillance Assistant? An Exploratory Case Study of AI-Assisted Surveillance Risks

The paper investigates how ChatGPT can be used to assist in surveillance, presenting an exploratory case study that tests 110 prompts—split between jailbreak and direct approaches—to elicit surveillance-related guidance. The authors develop a taxonomy of seven risk categories and find that ChatGPT provides substantive surveillance instructions for a majority of the prompts, often lacking policy references or privacy-preserving suggestions. Even when the model refuses, it may still supply detailed instructions or code with minimal ethical caveats.

arXiv AI
Aug 11

Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards

arXiv:2604. 23341v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs) as assistants in electric grid operations promises to streamline compliance and decision-making but exposes new vulnerabilities to prompt-based adversarial attacks.

By Taha Hammadia, Lucas Rea, Ahmad Mohammad Saber, Amr Youssef, Deepa Kundur
arXiv AI
Sep 7

TIER: Threat Implicitness Benchmark for Evaluating LLM Safety Behaviors

The paper introduces TIER, a Threat Implicitness Benchmark designed to evaluate large language model (LLM) safety behaviors across four risk domains and four threat levels, ranging from explicit harmful requests to sophisticated jailbreaks. Responses are scored on a six-label behavior scale by two independent LLM judges. Experiments on six open-weight LLMs reveal that safety behaviors change gradually with threat level, contextual prompts produce the most varied responses, and jailbreaks expose significant robustness gaps, underscoring the importance of behavior-aware safety evaluation.

By Thu-Hien Trinh-Thi, Hai-Yen Vong, Thanh-Ha Ung-Dung, Tram Ho
arXiv AI
Jul 28

Do LLMs Know Their Vulnerable Scenarios?

arXiv:2607. 23496v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety-aligned large language models are trained to refuse harmful requests, yet embedding the same requests in particular scenarios can bypass their safeguards.

By Ziheng Peng, Huiqi Deng, Haoran Jing, Xuankun Rong, Jiahui Han, Xiting Wang, Na Zou, Xia Hu
arXiv AI
Aug 7

AISPA: User-Centric System Prompt Auditing for Large Language Model Applications

arXiv:2607. 28617v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: System prompts are instructions configured by developers to govern the behaviors of foundation models in AI applications.

By Xiangning Lin, Shenzhe Zhu, Shu Yang, Zhenyu Zhang, Haoqian Zhang, Yipeng Zhao, Chengxuan Qian, Tianwei Wang, Ziheng Zhang, Zhenlong Yuan, Dingcheng Wang, Juncheng Wu, Yuan Si, Jiaxin Liu, Baolong Bi, Robert Mahari, Tobin South, Dazza Greenwood, Zexue He, Rishi Bommasani, Sophia Kazinnik, Andreas Haupt, Samuele Marro, Erik Brynjolfsson, Alex Pentland, Jiaxin Pei