Federated learning distributes data among $n$ clients, making it vulnerable to malicious attacks and data heterogeneity, which together pose challenges for robust learning. To tackle this issue, centered clipping and Huber aggregators have been exploited for Byzantine robustness.
arXiv:2607. 10970v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Federated learning distributes data among $n$ clients, making it vulnerable to malicious attacks and data heterogeneity, which together pose challenges for robust learning.
arXiv:2609.36660v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study federated learning (FL) with adversarial clients, where the goal is to minimize the average loss of the honest (non-adversarial) clients witho...
The paper proposes Byrd-NAFL, a Byzantine‑robust federated learning algorithm that incorporates Nesterov’s momentum and resilient aggregation rules. It achieves fast and safe convergence under non‑convex, smooth loss functions with relaxed gradient assumptions, and provides a finite‑time convergence guarantee. Experiments show that Byrd-NAFL outperforms existing methods in convergence speed, accuracy, and resilience to various malicious attacks.
arXiv:2605. 28335v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Federated Learning (FL) enables multiple clients to collaboratively train models without sharing raw data, but it is highly vulnerable to Byzantine attacks.
arXiv:2608. 01095v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Federated learning (FL) enables multiple intelligent devices to collaboratively train a high-accuracy model without sharing raw data.
arXiv:2609.15521v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Federated learning enables multiple parties to train a shared model without centralizing raw data with the help of an aggregator, but introduces integr...
arXiv:2506. 18020v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Robust distributed learning algorithms aim to maintain reliable performance despite the presence of misbehaving workers.
arXiv:2609.07312v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: This paper proposes a robust decentralized personalized federated learning method R-DPFL, that enables clients to reduce the impact of Byzantine attack...
The paper introduces DP‑BR‑FedAvg, a federated learning framework that combines Gaussian‑mechanism differential privacy with a coordinate‑wise trimmed‑mean Byzantine‑robust aggregation rule. It is evaluated on a simulated cross‑institutional classification task involving fraud and clinical‑risk scoring, where it improves the F1‑score for a minority class from 0.030 (plain FedAvg) to 0.119 while bounding privacy loss. The study demonstrates that privacy and robustness mechanisms interact, and that system design for regulated, adversarial, cross‑institutional settings must account for this interaction.
The paper studies federated learning where honest clients have heterogeneous data-generating models and adversarial clients can exacerbate this heterogeneity by sending arbitrary updates. It derives new bounds on gradient heterogeneity for linear and nonlinear regression, separating effects from honest clients’ model differences, label noise, and initialization. The authors show that for any (f,κ)-robust aggregator with κ = O(f/n) (where f is the number of adversarial clients and n the total number of clients, with f/n < 1/2), convergence is guaranteed after an explicit sample burn‑in period.
The paper introduces DP‑BR‑FedAvg, a federated learning framework that combines Gaussian‑mechanism differential privacy with a coordinate‑wise trimmed‑mean Byzantine‑robust aggregation rule. It is evaluated on a simulated cross‑institutional classification task for fraud and clinical‑risk scoring, showing that plain FedAvg fails when a quarter of twenty clients are Byzantine, while DP‑BR‑FedAvg recovers more signal and bounds privacy loss. The study demonstrates that privacy and robustness interact, and system design for regulated, adversarial, cross‑institutional settings must account for this interaction.
arXiv:2606. 10780v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Secure aggregation is a vital component for mitigating gradient leakage in federated learning, but its communication cost conventionally scales with the gradient dimension.