arXiv AI

SyzHarness: Patch-Based Kernel Bug Reproduction with LLM-Synthesized Fuzzing Harnesses

arXiv AI
Sep 7

When LLM Decompilers Recompile More and Preserve Less

The paper examines how large‑language‑model (LLM) decompilers, which produce clean, idiomatic C code, are currently evaluated mainly on recompilability and passing shipped tests. It shows that these metrics can mask significant behavioral differences: a decompiled function may recompile and pass all tests yet diverge on other inputs or lose disclosed vulnerabilities. To address this, the authors propose Decompile‑Diverge, a behavioral oracle that synthesizes drivers, fuzzes inputs, and compares the decompiled code’s behavior to the original, revealing divergences in up to 13% of cases and exposing gaps in current evaluation suites.

By Chang Liu, Edward Raff, Kristopher Micinski
arXiv Machine Learning
2d ago

What Do They Fix? LLM-Aided Categorization of Security Patches for Critical Memory Bugs

The paper introduces DUALLM, a dual-method pipeline that uses a Large Language Model and a fine‑tuned small language model to classify Linux kernel security patches with high precision. By analyzing commit titles, messages, diffs, and code context, DUALLM achieves 87.4% accuracy and an F1‑score of 0.875, outperforming existing methods. It successfully identified 111 recent patches addressing out‑of‑bounds or use‑after‑free vulnerabilities, with 90 confirmed true positives and proof‑of‑concept exploits demonstrating the validity of the classifications.

By Xingyu Li (UC Riverside), Juefei Pu (UC Riverside), Yifan Wu (UC Riverside), Xiaochen Zou (UC Riverside), Shitong Zhu (UC Riverside), Qiushi Wu (UC Riverside), Zheng Zhang (UC Riverside), Joshua Hsu (UC Riverside), Yue Dong (UC Riverside), Zhiyun Qian (UC Riverside), Kangjie Lu (UC Riverside), Trent Jaeger (UC Riverside), Michael De Lucia (UC Riverside), Srikanth V. Krishnamurthy (UC Riverside)
arXiv Machine Learning
Sep 22

Measuring the Checker: Mutation Analysis for GPU-Kernel Benchmark Oracles

The paper introduces mutation analysis as a metric for evaluating GPU‑kernel benchmark oracles, injecting over ten thousand faults into verified CUDA implementations of 188 KernelBench problems. It shows that the current official checkers miss 16.9% of faults, with precision faults being especially problematic, and demonstrates that optimized test suites can achieve 98% detection with only two inputs per problem. The study also reveals flaws in existing patches and a fuzzing recipe that incorrectly rejects correct kernels 107 times.

By Mingzhe Du, Anh Tuan Luu, Dong Huang, See-Kiong Ng
arXiv Machine Learning
Aug 27

FuzzingBrain-Bench V1: Evaluating Open-Ended Bug Discovery by LLMs

FuzzingBrain‑Bench V1 is a new benchmark that tests large language models (LLMs) on their ability to discover software bugs in open‑source projects. Unlike prior benchmarks that focus on a single target vulnerability, this benchmark gives models a Docker‑based harness and asks them to generate inputs that trigger as many distinct crashes as possible. The first version contains 77 challenges from 43 projects (36 C, 32 C++, 9 Java/JVM) and evaluates Claude Haiku 4.5, Claude Sonnet 4.6, and Claude Opus 4.8, with Claude Opus 4.8 achieving the highest score by triggering crashes in 60 of 77 challenges.

By Ze Sheng, Aleksandar Kezic, Zhicheng Chen, Jeff Huang
arXiv AI
Sep 4

PatchBench: Evaluating AI Agents for Vulnerability Patching

PatchBench introduces a benchmark to evaluate AI agents on realistic vulnerability patching tasks, addressing two key threats to validity: patch memorization and surface-level fixes that merely suppress crashes. The study finds that 25% of agent patches resemble historical developer patches, and that PoC-only validation inflates success rates by 1.83× on average. PatchBench mitigates these issues by selecting vulnerabilities whose true fixes lie outside the crash stack, migrating historical vulnerabilities into new contexts, and employing rigorous validation for security and semantic correctness.

By Chihao Shen, Jiacheng Li, Aastha Mahajan, Jeffery Siyuan Tian, Yonghwi Kwon, Yizheng Chen
arXiv AI
Sep 7

The History Is the Detector: Executing CVE Patch History, End-to-End

The paper introduces BUGSTONE‑E2E, a framework that converts vulnerability history into executable detection rules and validates them. It mines reusable rules from fixing commits, organizes them by CWE and language, and applies a funnel‑shaped pipeline that starts with lightweight analysis and culminates in LLM‑guided inspection, runtime verification, and patch generation. Using 19,325 high‑severity CVEs, the system identified 2,710 fixing commits, created 1,033 detection rules across 56 CWE families, and produced runtime evidence for 644 findings in 14 programs.

By Qiushi Wu, Kevin Eykholt, Youngja Park, Xiaokui Shu, Dhilung Kirat, Douglas Lee Schales, Ian Molloy
arXiv AI
Jul 23

Beyond Fail-to-Pass: Iterative Hardening of Co-Generated Bug Reproduction Tests and Fixes

arXiv:2607. 19843v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) have made automated program repair (APR) increasingly practical for real-world bugs, but repairing directly from bug reports remains underconstrained.

By Yuhao Tan, Zhibang Yang, Fangkai Yang, Yuan Yao, Yu Kang, Lu Wang, Pu Zhao, Xin Zhang, Xiaoxing Ma, Qingwei Lin, Saravan Rajmohan, Dongmei Zhang