arXiv:2605. 05000v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: LLM agents have been increasingly adopted for solving security tasks.
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arXiv:2609.08040v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The software supply chain has become an increasingly exposed attack surface because of its reliance on intricate yet fragile dependencies. Existing d...
arXiv:2606. 18619v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The advent of agentic vulnerability detection is already becoming a watershed moment for software security.
The paper examines how large‑language‑model (LLM) decompilers, which produce clean, idiomatic C code, are currently evaluated mainly on recompilability and passing shipped tests. It shows that these metrics can mask significant behavioral differences: a decompiled function may recompile and pass all tests yet diverge on other inputs or lose disclosed vulnerabilities. To address this, the authors propose Decompile‑Diverge, a behavioral oracle that synthesizes drivers, fuzzes inputs, and compares the decompiled code’s behavior to the original, revealing divergences in up to 13% of cases and exposing gaps in current evaluation suites.
arXiv:2605. 26548v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Finding a real vulnerability in complicated systems is a challenging, long-horizon task that demands reasoning across an entire codebase to produce a working proof-of-concept (PoC).
arXiv:2509. 22097v5 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language model-powered code agents are rapidly transforming software engineering, yet the security risks of their generated code have become a critical concern.
The paper introduces RedHerring, a defense mechanism that inserts safe decoy vulnerabilities into code repositories to divert autonomous LLM agents’ verification efforts away from real security flaws. By embedding CVE-derived vulnerability chains with false bridges and providing a private certificate for quick verification, RedHerring forces agents to spend a significant portion of their limited resources on decoys. Experiments on 33 OSS‑Fuzz projects show a 38.7‑60.4% reduction in discovered real vulnerabilities, even when agents are aware of decoys.