arXiv:2606. 05644v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: When retrieved evidence contradicts parametric memory, language models frequently ignore context and default to memorized priors -- a failure that undermines the core purpose of retrieval augmentation.
By Zhe Yu, Wenpeng Xing, Tiancheng Zhao, Mohan Li, Changting Lin, Meng Han
arXiv:2608. 11138v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We propose that a model's uncertainty about a token is reflected not only in the breadth of its output distribution but also in whether a confident prediction is \emph{fragile} under perturbation of its attention pathways.
By Minsoo Kim, Sungyoung Ji, Kisung Moon, Ilyong Yoon
arXiv:2606. 06286v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models can reproduce training data, but existing memorization evaluations mostly measure whether models can be forced to do so, rather than whether they do so under ordinary use.
By Gianluca Barmina, Peter Schneider-Kamp, Lukas Galke Poech
arXiv:2607. 26849v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As large language models (LLMs) are deployed in high-stakes domains, adversaries may poison training data to implant backdoors: hidden triggers that covertly manipulate model behavior at inference time.
By Anthony Hughes, Nicole Xing, Collin Francel, Andy Kim, Andrew Draganov
arXiv:2608. 15412v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Encoder-based code representation models remain widely deployed for discriminative tasks such as clone detection and code classification, where their small size and low inference cost are decisive.
By Yifeng He, Yundi Xu, Christopher Castro Gaw Gonzalo, Zili Wang, Hao Chen
arXiv:2605. 03217v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in settings that require nuanced ethical reasoning, yet existing bias evaluations treat model outputs as simply "biased" or "unbiased.
By Yash Aggarwal, Atmika Gorti, Vinija Jain, Aman Chadha, Krishnaprasad Thirunarayan, Manas Gaur
arXiv:2606. 18383v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Sparse autoencoders (SAEs) are increasingly used to extract interpretable features from language models (LMs), yet a central question remains: when can an SAE-based explanation be treated as a faithful view of an underlying frozen LM We study this through a post-hoc generalization framework that certifies the LM via a sparse proxy, obtained by replacing a native hidden activation with its pretrained SAE reconstruction.
By Dibyanayan Bandyopadhyay, Asif Ekbal
arXiv:2506. 14003v5 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Machine unlearning (MU) for large language models (LLMs), commonly referred to as LLM unlearning, seeks to remove specific undesirable data or knowledge from a trained model, while maintaining its performance on standard tasks.
By Yiwei Chen, Soumyadeep Pal, Yimeng Zhang, Qing Qu, Sijia Liu
arXiv:2606. 02211v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models are often influenced by extraneous input features, such as cues revealing a user's preferred answer.
By Sohaib Imran, Prakhar Gupta, Jannes Elstner, David Demitri Africa
arXiv:2605. 28591v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The validity of AI safety evaluations depends on models behaving consistently across controlled and deployment settings.
By Katharina Deckenbach, Haritz Puerto, Jonas Geiping, Sahar Abdelnabi
arXiv:2607. 28801v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Benchmark datasets are central to evaluating Large Language Models (LLMs), yet they are typically conceived as monolithic tasks, obscuring substantial variation in the demands of individual samples.
By Philipp D. Siedler, Jordan Sassoon
As large language models (LLMs) are deployed in high-stakes domains, adversaries may poison training data to implant backdoors: hidden triggers that covertly manipulate model behavior at inference time. We ask whether a defender can recover such a trigger under realistic affordances, namely white-box access to the weights and knowledge of the behavior of concern, but no training data, no trusted reference model, no knowledge of the trigger, and no certainty that the model is poisoned.