VX‑One is a small multi‑head neural network that outputs typed, calibrated decision primitives— a calibrated gate, a closed‑set choice with an explicit unknown option, and an ordinal score—trained in a multi‑task, temperature‑calibrated manner. In experiments on UNSW‑NB15, CIC‑IDS2017, and EMBER2024, VX‑One outperforms traditional models on detection metrics and achieves high recall when combined with a signature engine in a two‑phase cascade, though its calibration degrades under temporal drift and it struggles with multi‑class attribution. The study provides a detailed empirical assessment of where such typed, calibrated decisions aid perimeter triage and where they fall short.
By Juan S. Santillana
arXiv:2610.30090v2 Announce Type: replace-cross
Abstract: Perimeter triage faces a latency/semantics trade-off: signature engines are fast and format-safe but blind to unseen attacks, while generativ...
By Juan S. Santillana
arXiv:2610.02267v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Agent harnesses make many small, typed decisions per task: which model to call, which tool to use, whether retrieved text is relevant, whether an input...
By Jiawei Li
arXiv:2608. 15565v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Experience-learning agents for optimization modeling improve by storing verified skills, but existing learners admit knowledge by checking against known answers, which real ticket streams do not provide.
By Junbo Jacob Lian, Huiling Chen, Hanzhang Qin, Chung-Piaw Teo
The paper evaluates System One decision models—typed models that output probabilities for branching decisions—against supervised classifiers and generative language models on automated decision gate tasks. Eight checkpoints from six families, including the hosted model Jev, were benchmarked on workflow, intent, and social‑science items, showing that small trained classifiers match or slightly outperform decision models on intent and workflow when labels are available, while decision models outperform zero‑shot classifiers when labels are absent. The study also explores calibration, risk thresholds, and cost‑efficiency trade‑offs, providing condition‑dependent design guidelines for automated decision gates.
By Amir Rafe, Subasish Das
arXiv:2604. 11943v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: An OS kernel that runs LLM inference internally can read the model's own next-token logit distribution before any text is generated, and act on it as a governance primitive.
By Daeyeon Son
arXiv:2610. 29052v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A typed decision maps evidence, a question and a fixed set of options to a probability for every option, computed in one forward pass, by reading a language model's logits or a small head over its hidden states, instead of generating and parsing text.
By Yuchuan Weng, Chi Liu, Xin Chen, Srinivasan Manoharan
arXiv:2606. 20502v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Whether LLMs scoring well on vulnerability benchmarks genuinely reason about security or merely pattern-match on contaminated data remains unresolved.
By Arastoo Zibaeirad, Marco Vieira
arXiv:2608. 15761v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Edge-IIoTset is the reference benchmark for machine-learning intrusion detection in the industrial Internet of Things, and results reported on it cluster above 99%.
By Mostafa M. Galal
arXiv:2609.23886v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Software delegates more of its branches to models every year: which queue a ticket enters, whether a command is safe to run, whether a claim clears wit...
By Zehua Cheng, Wei Dai, Jiahao Sun
This thesis introduces methods for assessing and enhancing the robustness of large language models (LLMs) against adversarial input variations. It proposes a generative robustness metric, R_stab(f), based on Jensen‑Shannon divergence, and proves bounds for localized attacks. The work also presents adaptive attacks, Trojan detection techniques, defense strategies for multi‑layer systems, and lightweight attestation for Model Context Protocol (MCP) agentic systems, all implemented in the JudgeGuard, TrojanArmor, and MCPSec suites.
By Narek Maloyan
DriftNet is a dual‑head trajectory Transformer designed to detect and localize prompt injection attacks in large language model agents. It processes logged tool‑call trajectories, classifying each as compromised or not while labeling every step as benign, injection point, hijacked, or failed injection. On the AgentDrift benchmark, DriftNet achieves high accuracy, with an F1 score of 0.983, 98.7% exact injection‑point recovery, and low false‑alarm rates.
By Asif Pinjari, Mithun Paul Saint-Germain