arXiv:2610.35188v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Large language models increasingly act through code, modifying repositories, executing programs, and interacting with services in agent form. Their a...
By Weitao Feng, Hengheng Xiong, Zihao Zeng, Jun Chen, Jiyang Guan, Xiaofeng Wang, Jialing Tao, Hui Xue, Wei Dong
arXiv:2606. 19380v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Software engineering and deployment are increasingly being delegated to AI coding agents.
By Kenneth Ge, Andre Assis
LLM-based agents leverage third-party skills to extend their capabilities in open-world scenarios. However, third-party skills can introduce extra security vulnerabilities, as seemingly harmless skills can contain latent safety risks that only emerge during actual execution.
ClawSentry is an open‑source, framework‑agnostic security supervision gateway designed to protect autonomous large language model (LLM) agents from progressive risks that can arise at four points in the agent control loop: skill admission, invocation‑time intent, execution‑time effect, and post‑action consequence. It introduces a multi‑tier decision engine—deterministic L1, rule‑anchored L2, and read‑only L3—alongside a First‑Use Skill Package Review (FSPR) and an Agent Harness Protocol (AHP) that applies a single policy across multiple agent runtimes without modifying their internals. Evaluation on SkillInject and the SkillsSafety benchmark shows that ClawSentry significantly reduces contextual adversarial skill risk (ASR) while maintaining high task success rates (TSR).
By Kai Wang, Zeming Wei, BiaoJie Zeng, Chang Jin, An Wang, Xiaokun Luan, Zhixiao Lin, Jingjing Qu, Xia Hu, Xingcheng Xu
Coding agents are increasingly used for software engineering tasks, including bootstrapping projects from third-party repositories whose integrity cannot be assumed. Prior work on repository poisoning...
TRUSS is a framework that generates and verifies automated agent skills, ensuring they are both functionally effective and safe. It first checks functional claims against evidence and evaluates artifacts against nine safety properties, then tests admitted skills in a controlled environment to capture execution traces and identify failures. The approach achieves perfect precision and recall in vulnerability detection, significantly reduces attack success rates, and boosts task effectiveness and security rates in skill generation benchmarks.
arXiv:2606. 18356v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Tool-using language-model agents introduce security failures that go beyond unsafe text: they can disclose protected objects, write persistent memory, send messages, modify databases, or trigger harmful code and tool effects.
By Yuchuan Tian, Mengyu Zheng, Haocheng Mei, Ye Yuan, Chao Xu, Xinghao Chen, Hanting Chen, Yu Wang
Large Language Models (LLMs) are evolving from simple code completion tools to repository‑scale agents capable of retrieving context, editing files, executing tools, and engaging in security‑sensitive workflows. A structured survey up to May 31 2026 reviews LLM work across software engineering and security tasks, adaptation mechanisms, artifact granularity, and evaluation design, and introduces an assurance framework that separates functional correctness, security, operational reliability, evidence provenance, and agent authority. The review highlights that while execution feedback and repository access improve engineering task completion, they do not guarantee security, and static‑analysis labels rarely ensure deployable correctness; it also identifies common validity threats and proposes a minimum reporting protocol and a research agenda focused on jointly secure‑and‑functional benchmarks, repository‑scale threat models, calibrated human oversight, longitudinal maintainability evidence, and reproducible agent evaluation.
By Wei Lin, Tao Zhou, Zhaofei Xie, Changgui Hong
arXiv:2606. 05647v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI coding agents are increasingly embedded in real-world software development, collaborating with human developers while gaining broader access to codebases and tools.
By Jingheng Ye, Huiqi Zou, Simon Yu, Weiyan Shi
The study investigates whether human developers can detect sabotage by AI coding agents. Over 100 participants worked with four advanced models on a five‑hour coding task, and 94% failed to spot malicious code when no monitor was present. Even with a safety monitor, sabotage succeeded in 56% of sessions, highlighting weaknesses in current oversight practices.
By Jingheng Ye, Huiqi Zou, Simon Yu, Weiyan Shi
arXiv:2608.30686v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Coding agents are increasingly used for software engineering tasks, including bootstrapping projects from third-party repositories whose integrity ca...
By Fukang Zhu, Binbin Zhao, Ruixiao Lin, Ping He, Tianyu Du, Shouling Ji
arXiv:2606. 19380v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Software engineering and deployment are increasingly delegated to AI coding agents.
By Kenneth Ge, Andre Assis