The paper investigates how well the implicit value rankings encoded by frontier AI systems—termed constitutional institutions—meet human demand. By auditing 23 large language model archetypes and surveying 1,649 U.S. participants, the authors find that user demand spans all five values (safety, helpfulness, honesty, autonomy, equity) but the supply is narrow, covering only about 2% of the demand space, with no model prioritizing helpfulness or autonomy. They propose a sparse two‑vertex menu that substantially reduces regret compared to the full set of models and formalize these observations as a budgeted‑pluralism trilemma. whyItMatters":"The study reveals a significant mismatch between the values users prioritize and the values encoded by current AI models, highlighting the need for more diverse and aligned constitutional designs."
arXiv:2606. 28710v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We ask under what conditions an agent with a harm-minimizing policy can displace an approval-seeking (RLHF) agent in a competitive market, and when that policy is sufficient to prevent community harm.
arXiv:2609.05531v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: No specification says how a governed autotelic AI agent organization, where agents pursue self-generated goals inside guardrails, should be designed...
The paper proposes a transparent, user‑configurable rule for selecting arguments in deliberative polls, replacing opaque learned rankers. It formalises argument selection over bipolar justification sets, introduces seven civic recommender criteria, and presents a one‑hop reversed endorsement flow rule that meets them. Experiments on 17,000 simulated runs show the rule performs comparably to random on coverage but outperforms other methods on endorsement mass and robustness under adversarial pressure.
arXiv:2607. 09706v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Language models turn a worded situation into a numeric plan, and the dominant pipelines (NL4Opt, OptiMUS, ORLM, OR-LLM-Agent) commit to a single objective and point-valued coefficients, then solve once.
arXiv:2606. 08919v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As LLM agents begin to take real, irreversible actions (shell commands, file edits, deploys), the standard safety pattern is a human-in-the-loop approval gate: risky actions pause and wait for a person.
arXiv:2606. 12502v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We propose that value -- the quantity goal-directed agents create, destroy, and exchange -- is a lawful structural quantity in the same category as information.
The study evaluates how to best split tasks among large‑language‑model agents for cross‑border VAT determination, comparing one broad agent to configurations ranging from one to five narrow agents. Across 4,400 runs—including token‑matched and failure‑injection scenarios—the intermediate configurations achieved the highest accuracy but did not surpass the fine‑endpoint benchmark, leaving the optimal decomposition hypothesis unconfirmed. The pilot provides a preregistered heuristic for right‑sizing decomposition, along with an oracle, dataset, and analysis pipeline.
arXiv:2608. 16055v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Existing agent benchmarks ask whether the agent finished the task.
arXiv:2608. 12599v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Multi-turn dialogues let users revoke constraints as easily as impose them, but revocation does not reliably take effect: models keep enacting withdrawn requirements (occasionally beneath comments asserting their removal), a failure we call \emph{behavioral relapse}, or revocation inertia.
arXiv:2606. 11522v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Autoresearch agents now propose, evaluate, and select scientific candidates against a metric, and that metric is usually an aggregate reduced over a heterogeneous space of regions, slices, or cohorts.
arXiv:2605. 27914v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Benchmarking is mature where answers are verifiable -- math, code, reasoning -- but the fastest-growing uses of LLMs are subjective and human-facing: companionship, emotional support, counseling.
arXiv:2607. 28685v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agent-safety benchmarks measure different behaviors, and their scores get quoted interchangeably as an agent's safety.