arXiv:2510. 20739v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Program analysis tools often produce large volumes of candidate vulnerability reports that require costly manual review, creating a practical challenge: how can security analysts prioritize the reports most likely to be true vulnerabilities?
arXiv:2512. 10485v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Vulnerability detection methods based on deep learning (DL) have shown strong performance on benchmark datasets, yet their real-world effectiveness remains underexplored.
The paper surveys 87 influential studies on machine‑learning‑based automated vulnerability detection (ML4AVD), categorizing them by problem formulation, input and detection granularity, target languages, evaluation metrics, datasets, and detection approaches. It identifies twelve self‑reinforcing pain points—such as overreliance on binary classification of C/C++ function‑level vulnerabilities, limited language coverage, and intertwined datasets, baselines, and metrics—that trap the field in a narrow, artificial problem space. The authors propose concrete recommendations to break these feedback loops and evaluate a recent high‑profile effort, AIxCC, against these guidelines, reflecting on ML4AVD’s relevance amid the rise of agentic AI.
arXiv:2604. 04977v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Software supply chain security compromises often stem from cascaded interactions of vulnerabilities, for example, between multiple vulnerable components.
arXiv:2605. 26548v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Finding a real vulnerability in complicated systems is a challenging, long-horizon task that demands reasoning across an entire codebase to produce a working proof-of-concept (PoC).
arXiv:2606. 05986v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Existing learning-based detectors for Solidity smart-contracts reduce vulnerability detection to syntactic pattern matching within single functions, yet many of the most consequential exploits (The DAO, Cream Finance) exist not in any individual function but in the relationship between functions and in the combination of conditions that made the attack feasible.
arXiv:2607. 26656v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Real-world vulnerabilities often span multiple functions, yet most learning-based detectors classify each function in isolation: on a sample of real CVEs, we find that 71.
arXiv:2608.22089v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Modern software systems require earlier and more scalable vulnerability severity assessment to reduce exposure to high-impact security flaws. Securit...
arXiv:2512. 18542v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: AI coding assistants produce vulnerable code in 45\% of security-relevant scenarios~\cite{veracode2025}, yet no public training dataset teaches both traditional web security and AI/ML-specific defenses in a format suitable for instruction tuning.
arXiv:2608. 06471v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Despite recent advances, frontier large language model (LLM) agents remain limited in discovering and patching complex vulnerabilities in real-world software.
arXiv:2609.08040v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The software supply chain has become an increasingly exposed attack surface because of its reliance on intricate yet fragile dependencies. Existing d...
arXiv:2606. 15123v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We study the task of CVE-conditioned exploit generation, where a model drafts proof-of-concept (PoC) exploits given software vulnerability context.
arXiv:2605. 09504v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We present swarm-attack, an open-source adversarial testing framework in which multiple lightweight LLM agents coordinate through shared memory, parallel exploration, and evolutionary optimization.