arXiv:2512. 18542v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: AI coding assistants produce vulnerable code in 45\% of security-relevant scenarios~\cite{veracode2025}, yet no public training dataset teaches both traditional web security and AI/ML-specific defenses in a format suitable for instruction tuning.
arXiv:2608. 06471v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Despite recent advances, frontier large language model (LLM) agents remain limited in discovering and patching complex vulnerabilities in real-world software.
arXiv:2606. 31639v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models are no longer only text generators.
arXiv:2605. 26548v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Finding a real vulnerability in complicated systems is a challenging, long-horizon task that demands reasoning across an entire codebase to produce a working proof-of-concept (PoC).
arXiv:2606. 03453v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Vulnerability disclosure volumes now far exceed organizational assessment capacity, yet three adjacent research communities (proof-of-concept generation, vulnerability prioritization, and detection rule engineering) operate largely in isolation.
arXiv:2507. 02964v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The increasing scale of AI workloads demands High-Performance Computing (HPC) infrastructure and training methodologies that are both scalable and sustainable.
arXiv:2606. 02240v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Indirect prompt injection in tool-use agents is a concrete production threat: LLM agents read from integrations (third-party services such as Gmail, Salesforce, or Jira accessed through tool calls) whose response content the user neither writes nor controls.
arXiv:2608. 08468v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agent Skills---structured packages of instructions and scripts that augment LLM-based agents---are rapidly proliferating, yet their security properties remain under-explored.
arXiv:2608. 16187v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI-assisted development tools generate vulnerable code at significant rates, yet few automated mechanisms exist to detect, enrich, fix, and verify security issues at development velocity, particularly ones that ground remediation in real-world threat context.
arXiv:2605. 10834v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: AI pentesting agents are increasingly credible as offensive security systems, but current benchmarks still provide limited guidance on which will perform best in real-world targets.
arXiv:2601. 19138v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Secure code review is critical during pre-integration, where Atlassian developers rely on lightweight analysis tools, while deep security assessment is deferred to later stages, delaying feedback and increasing remediation costs.
arXiv:2606. 27091v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLMs fine-tuned for security classification are usually evaluated on held-out examples from the same distribution as their training data.
arXiv:2606. 18356v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Tool-using language-model agents introduce security failures that go beyond unsafe text: they can disclose protected objects, write persistent memory, send messages, modify databases, or trigger harmful code and tool effects.