arXiv:2505.02796v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We study budget pacing in repeated first-price auctions when an advertiser's private-value distributions change over time and the stationary...
The paper introduces Budget-Constrained Causal Bandits (BCCB), an online framework that learns individual treatment effects, explores uncertain users, and manages budget pacing simultaneously. It derives a per-arrival decision rule from a KKT condition of a Lagrangian relaxation, providing a principled algorithmic foundation. Experiments on the Criteo Uplift dataset show BCCB outperforms offline pipelines and other online baselines, especially when historical data is scarce (below 7,500 observations).
arXiv:2304. 14385v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We consider a novel pricing and advertising framework in which a seller not only sets the product price but also designs flexible advertising schemes to influence customers' valuations of the product.
The paper investigates online fair allocation of sequential items to agents with heterogeneous preferences, aiming to maximize generalized-mean welfare. In an i.i.d. arrival setting, a pure greedy algorithm achieves near-optimal “~O(1/T)” average regret without needing distributional knowledge. For nonstationary arrivals, the authors show that a single historical sample per distribution suffices to recover the same regret rate, using re-solving algorithms that remain robust to distribution shifts.
arXiv:2605. 09448v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We study the operational problem of automated bidding in repeated first-price auctions under budget and return-on-spend (RoS) constraints.
arXiv:2606. 29252v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study repeated bidding in multi-unit discriminatory (pay-as-bid) auctions for a single bidder with per-round utility equal to value minus $\alpha$ times payment, where $\alpha\in[0,1]$ is a cost-of-capital parameter.
We study repeated bidding in multi-unit discriminatory (pay-as-bid) auctions for a single bidder with per-round utility equal to value minus $α$ times payment, where $α\in[0,1]$ is a cost-of-capital parameter. The bidder aims to maximize cumulative utility over $T$ rounds subject to a total budget $B$.
arXiv:2607. 29460v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Heavy-tailed distributions arise naturally in sequential decision-making problems such as financial investment, online advertising, and network management, where rare but extreme outcomes can dominate performance.
arXiv:2606. 03736v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We study resource-constrained dynamic pricing when the seller seeks revenue and valid inference about demand at a price fixed before the selling season.
arXiv:2512. 22749v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We study the pricing behavior of third-party platforms facing strategic agents.
The paper studies how to allocate a fixed computational budget across the denoising steps of diffusion models to improve sample quality at deployment. It shows that the expected benefit of evaluating multiple candidates at a step can be decomposed into a step‑specific sensitivity and a universal sample‑size factor, and that the optimal allocation follows a water‑filling structure. Experiments demonstrate that this allocation achieves the same quality as a uniform strategy while reducing function evaluations by 20–50%.
arXiv:2609.00710v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: An LLM application often sells or internally allocates several service products: a small or premium model, a short or long token cap, and possibly mu...