arXiv:2502. 16184v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: The EU Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA) establishes different legal principles for different types of AI systems.
arXiv:2607. 02197v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The society and emerging risk-based regulatory frameworks for AI underscore the need for rigorous risk assessment to ensure safe and reliable AI systems.
arXiv:2408. 02379v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Developing and certifying safe - or so-called trustworthy - AI has become an increasingly salient issue, especially in light of upcoming regulation such as the EU AI Act.
The article proposes a structured framework of behavioral indicators that could signal a progression toward potentially catastrophic threats from AI systems. Drawing on established methods from cybersecurity and national security, it defines clear metrics, indicators, and thresholds across multiple dimensions of AI capability and behavior. The framework is intended to enable researchers and policymakers to implement evidence‑based monitoring protocols for rogue AI progression.
The paper systematically classifies the EU AI Act’s high‑risk requirements, finding that only a minority directly address AI‑specific risk sources while most impose organizational and documentation obligations. From these risk‑related requirements, the authors derive a consolidated list of distinct AI‑specific risk sources, creating an EU AI Act Risk Source List. This list aims to bridge the gap between legal obligations and AI risk‑management practice by providing a structured reference for comparing the Act’s implicit risk coverage with existing AI risk taxonomies.
arXiv:2606. 28929v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Cybersecurity is a real-life test-bed for many machine learning problems at once, especially when considering modern strides in using Large Language Models (LLMs) to automate processes as ``agents.
The article discusses a notable imbalance in AI security research, where studies on attacking AI systems outnumber those on defending them. It highlights that this skew is evident across various subfields such as federated learning, speech recognition, membership inference, and large language models. The authors argue that attack papers often benefit from favorable evaluation conditions, whereas defense papers face stricter standards, resulting in a literature rich in vulnerabilities but lacking robust, deployable protections.
arXiv:2606. 05710v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The increasing penetrations of the critical infrastructure sector in the United States with intelligent digital technologies have greatly increased exposure to advanced cyber adversaries and operational vulnerabilities.
arXiv:2605. 16281v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Post-deployment accountability has become central to AI governance, yet little empirical evidence shows whether monitoring, incident reporting, and impact assessment obligations are visible when AI systems fail.
arXiv:2607. 16112v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Frontier AI companies have published capability thresholds that differ substantially, making it difficult for third parties to verify whether a threshold has been crossed or to compare requirements across companies.
The paper argues that AI governance should rely on ISO-like interoperability protocols rather than solely on jurisdiction-specific laws. It proposes standardized AI nutrition labels that include metrics for bias, energy usage, and data provenance to enable machine‑readable risk communication across borders. These protocols aim to reduce regulatory fragmentation, lower barriers for SMEs, and build public trust while allowing modular evolution with technology.
arXiv:2608. 13272v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: A small number of firms based in two states produce the most capable frontier AI models.