arXiv:2606. 29748v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The application of graph data in numerous disciplines raises the need for gathering and analyzing huge volumes of data, some of which is private and sensitive.
By Adebayo Keji, Sayanton Dibbo
The paper evaluates privacy risks in graph neural networks enhanced by large language models (LLMs). Using a five‑stage framework, the authors test six real‑world text‑attributed graph datasets with 42 model configurations and six privacy attack methods across link, label, and membership inference threats. Results show that LLM‑enhanced GNNs are more vulnerable than shallow baselines, with semantic enrichment amplifying exploitable signals, and that differential privacy can reduce risk but at a significant cost to utility.
By Longzhu He, Zelang Wen, Chaozhuo Li, Sen Su
arXiv:2608.25727v2 Announce Type: replace
Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) have recently advanced graph neural networks (GNNs) by enriching node representations with semantic information, givin...
By Longzhu He, Zelang Wen, Chaozhuo Li, Sen Su
arXiv:2606. 04069v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Existing privacy analyses for Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) largely inherit assumptions from non-graph settings, overlooking structural correlations and stochastic training-graph sampling.
By Sinan Y{\i}ld{\i}r{\i}m, Megha Khosla
arXiv:2606. 08067v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Graph neural networks (GNNs) are widely deployed on relational data, yet they can leak sensitive or proprietary information about the training graph adjacency, e.
By Zhanke Zhou, Bo Han, Xuan Li, Jiangchao Yao, Sanmi Koyejo, Michael K. Ng
The paper presents an empirical audit of privacy leakage in edge‑private graph generators by testing whether outputs from edge‑neighbouring inputs remain distinguishable. It introduces statistically valid lower bounds on privacy loss and compares direct‑edge, local‑structural, and GNN‑based attacks based on the geometry around a target edge. Experiments on two generators and two networks reveal that privacy leakage varies with both the mechanism and the network, and that learned representations expose information beyond conventional local statistics.
By Anum Fatima, Stratis Limnios, James Adams, Lukasz Szpruch, Carsten Maple, Gesine Reinert, Andrew Elliott
arXiv:2608. 11495v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) serve as the backbone for high-stakes applications in Machine-Learning-as-a-Service (MLaaS).
By Yan Wen, Zhenyi Wang, Heng Huang
arXiv:2606. 25589v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As graph neural networks (GNNs) become standard tools for critical tasks in circuit design and analysis, their security and privacy risks require careful attention.
By Rupesh Raj Karn, Johann Knechtel, Ozgur Sinanoglu
arXiv:2601. 17130v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Graph neural networks (GNNs) are widely used for tasks such as node classification and link prediction, but their use in sensitive settings raises concerns about training-data leakage.
By Megha Khosla
arXiv:2608. 04255v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Graph inference over relational data can expose sensitive edge information, and this risk becomes more severe in dynamic graphs, where repeated model updates cause privacy loss to accumulate.
By Yuyang Xia, Ruixuan Liu, Li Xiong
arXiv:2607. 08659v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) have shown considerable success in learning from graph-structured data, but their use in privacy-sensitive areas remains difficult because graph structure can leak sensitive link information.
By Wenxiu Ding, Muzhi Liu, Zheng Yan, Mingjun Wang, Yifan Zhao, Qiao Liu
The paper "Privacy Leakage on DNNs: A Survey of Model Inversion Attacks and Defenses" provides a comprehensive review of model inversion (MI) attacks that exploit trained deep neural networks to reconstruct private training data. It traces the evolution of MI from early machine‑learning contexts to recent DNN‑based attacks across various modalities and learning tasks, offering a detailed taxonomy and comparative analysis of both attacks and defenses. The authors also present an open‑source toolbox on GitHub to support further research in this area.
By Hao Fang, Yixiang Qiu, Hongyao Yu, Wenbo Yu, Jiawei Kong, Baoli Chong, Bin Chen, Xuan Wang, Shu-Tao Xia, Ke Xu