arXiv:2502. 02260v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: In the past decade, considerable research effort has been devoted to securing machine learning (ML) models that operate in adversarial settings.
arXiv:2607. 13565v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We investigate which language model evasion attacks survive state-of-the-art adversarial fine-tuning, developing strategies that sweep the top 5 positions on the ELOQUENT 2026 Voight-Kampff leaderboard.
arXiv:2607. 28959v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Adversarial training is one of the most effective defenses against adversarial attacks, yet the computational cost remains prohibitive at modern scales, especially for large language models (LLMs).
arXiv:2509. 23689v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Model Merging (MM) has proven to be an effective alternative to multi-task learning, where several fine-tuned models are merged, without access to the tasks' training data, into one model that retains performance across different tasks.
Adversarial examples are inputs to machine learning models that an attacker has intentionally designed to cause the model to make a mistake; they’re like optical illusions for machines. In this post we’ll show how adversarial examples work across different mediums, and will discuss why securing systems against them can be difficult.
arXiv:2607. 09532v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We show how an adversarial model trainer can plant backdoors in a large class of deep, feedforward neural networks.
The paper introduces FAB, an attack that uses meta‑learning to embed dormant adversarial behaviors into large language models (LLMs). These behaviors remain inactive until the model is finetuned by downstream users, at which point the model can exhibit unwanted actions such as unsolicited advertising, jailbreakability, or over‑refusal. FAB is shown to be effective across multiple LLMs and resilient to various finetuning settings.
The paper introduces Perturbation, a method that treats representations in language models as learning conduits rather than activation patterns. By fine‑tuning a model on a single adversarial example and observing how this perturbation spreads to other inputs, the approach avoids geometric assumptions and does not identify representations in untrained models. In trained models, Perturbation uncovers structured transfer across multiple linguistic scales, indicating that language models generalize along representational lines and acquire linguistic abstractions through experience.
The paper introduces a new class of adversarial examples that are markedly different from original inputs yet produce the same model output. It presents algorithms such as NI-FGSM, NI-FGM, and their momentum variants (NMI-FGSM, NMI-FGM) to generate these examples. The authors demonstrate that these adversarial examples are not confined to the vicinity of training data but are spread throughout the sample space.
arXiv:2609.22221v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) can generate fluent and coherent text that is increasingly difficult to distinguish from human writing, motivating the dev...
arXiv:2406. 10090v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Thanks to their extensive capacity, over-parameterized neural networks exhibit superior predictive capabilities and generalization.
arXiv:2503. 06269v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Traditional white-box methods for creating adversarial perturbations against LLMs typically rely only on gradient computation from the targeted model, ignoring the internal mechanisms responsible for attack success or failure.
UniGuardian is a training‑free detector for large language models that jointly identifies prompt injection, backdoor, and adversarial attacks—collectively called Prompt Trigger Attacks (PTA). It measures how structured prompt perturbations shift the model’s output distribution and uses a single‑forward strategy to detect attacks while generating text in a shared batched forward pass. Experiments show that UniGuardian accurately and efficiently identifies trigger‑activated prompts in LLMs.