arXiv:2603. 23530v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models often fail to satisfy formatting instructions when they must simultaneously perform demanding tasks.
By Avni Mittal
arXiv:2607. 19257v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Practitioners make three prompt-design decisions with almost no controlled evidence behind them: how to format instructions and context (markdown, plain text, prose, or tabular), how many simultaneous instructions a system prompt can carry before compliance degrades, and how much context a model can hold before recall and honesty degrade.
By Netanel Eliav
Practitioners make three prompt-design decisions with almost no controlled evidence behind them: how to format instructions and context (markdown, plain text, prose, or tabular), how many simultaneous instructions a system prompt can carry before compliance degrades, and how much context a model can hold before recall and honesty degrade. We report two controlled experiments crossing all three factors on one held, contamination-free synthetic corpus (the "Book of Veyra," 8,780 uniquely-named entities, deterministically regenerable from a fixed seed), evaluated across five models.
arXiv:2608. 02665v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A benchmark score is a measurement instrument, yet most benchmarks read each item at a single canonical surface form.
By Yongxi Zhou, Junwei Yao, Yuanzhe Liu, Zihan Dong, Wenbo Ye, Jiaxi Wen, Lai Yun Choi
arXiv:2606. 12117v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Benchmark scores often misrepresent a large language model's (LLM's) knowledge, because they rely, e.
By Selen Erkan, Bastian Boll, Kristian Kersting, Bj\"orn Deiseroth, Letitia Parcalabescu
arXiv:2605. 27752v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: LLM confidence calibration is often evaluated by comparing two signals: token-probability scores and verbalized confidence.
By Hankyeol Kim, Pilsung Kang
arXiv:2608. 17183v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Small Language Models (SLMs) are increasingly deployed in resource-constrained, privacy-sensitive settings, where safety and bias failures can cause security and societal risks.
By Nyamtulla Shaik, Fengjun Li, Bo Luo
arXiv:2606. 00920v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Run-level pass rate overstates retry-free coverage by up to 17.
By Yongxi Zhou, Lai Yun Choi, Jiaxi Wen, Wenbo Ye
arXiv:2606. 03648v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Adapting foundation large language models to a user's task or preferred style through fine-tuning can result in compromising the model's safety.
By Krishnapriya Vishnubhotla, Hillary Dawkins, Isar Nejadgholi, Svetlana Kiritchenko
arXiv:2608. 04714v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Benchmark scores are reported as properties of a model, yet the inference framework used to produce them, such as HuggingFace, vLLM, or Ollama, are considered non-influential and their names and versions are almost never disclosed.
By Shahed Masoudian, Passant Shafaei, Monorama Swain, Markus Schedl
arXiv:2608. 06202v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM) benchmark evaluations are routinely used to support claims about model safety, reliability, and deployment readiness.
By Ro Encarnaci\'on, Tina Behzad, Emma Lurie, Dana\'e Metaxa
arXiv:2608. 11727v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: When a coding agent obeys a rule, it may simply have been going to do that anyway.
By Zining Huang, Haoran Que, Hong Zeng, Ge Zhang, Zuo Wang, Jin Chen, Haodong Wang, Zhongfei Hou, Changxin Pu, Shen Yan, Wenhao Huang