arXiv AI

LLMs Don't Pay for the Jump

arXiv:2608. 14397v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Zahavy [2026] argues that Large Language Models, despite their capabilities in induction and deduction, cannot perform the abductive "Jump" that produced Einstein's equivalence principle, and attributes this limitation to the absence of embodied simulation.

Hugging Face Trending Papers
Jul 5

Why Pure Reasoning is Not Enough: Nature as the Source of Mathematical Innovation

We advance the hypothesis that human mathematical reasoning, constrained by both the undecidability and the computational intractability of even modest logical fragments, relies fundamentally on pattern matching from domains external to pure deduction. The most prolific reservoir of such patterns is the natural world, whose physical laws and biological systems have undergone billions of years of ``pre-computation'' and already exhibit surprisingly innovative solutions.

arXiv AI
Sep 15

One Model, Two Physical Stories: Auditing Misalignment in Multi-Modal World Modeling

The paper investigates how multi‑modal world models can produce inconsistent outputs across different modalities, such as a video showing a ball not rebounding while a text description indicates it should. It defines two types of misalignment—internal (between modalities) and external (against a physical environment)—and introduces a physics‑grounded pipeline to measure these discrepancies. Experiments across multiple settings reveal that while the model’s language output matches the true environment, its video output frequently disagrees, indicating current unified backbones struggle with simultaneous reasoning, consistency, and physical fidelity.

By Geigh Zollicoffer, Minh Vu, Rajiv Ranasinghe, Manish Bhattarai
arXiv AI
Sep 7

Evidence Integration in Large Language Models

The paper proposes a distributional theory explaining how large language models (LLMs) incorporate external evidence into their decision-making process. It identifies three key predictions: (1) evidence is more persuasive when it aligns with the model’s prior beliefs, (2) models more readily accept errors from their own internal processes than from external sources, and (3) the same evidence can improve weaker models while harming stronger ones. Extensive experiments across ten million trials, twelve LLMs from four families, and eight domains—including quantum mechanics, physics, genetics, and molecular biology—confirm these predictions and reveal that evidence integration occurs late in the network as a structured sequence of steps rather than through a simple trust metric.

By Sebastien Kawada, Manolis Kellis
arXiv AI
Sep 21

Large Language Models As Shannon Lossy Compressors Not Solomonoff Induction Estimators: The Singularity Is Not Near Without Symbolic Model Synthesis

The paper argues that Large Language Models (LLMs) do not function as Solomonoff induction estimators because their training objectives—cross‑entropy, negative log‑likelihood, and next‑token prediction—optimize fit to a supplied conditional distribution rather than a program‑weighted universal mixture. It further contends that additional computation alone does not transform these models into optimal predictors without external hyper‑parameter or architectural changes. The authors suggest that neurosymbolic machine learning, exemplified by models such as Fable and Astra, represents a shift toward symbolic model synthesis, moving beyond purely statistical LLMs.

By Hector Zenil, Abicumaran Uthamacumaran, Luan Ozelim