arXiv:2605. 12813v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) achieve strong performance across many tasks but remain vulnerable to hallucinations, making it important to systematically evaluate their reliability under realistic adversarial inputs.
By Buyun Liang, Jinqi Luo, Liangzu Peng, Kwan Ho Ryan Chan, Darshan Thaker, Kaleab A. Kinfu, Fengrui Tian, Hamed Hassani, Ren\'e Vidal
arXiv:2507. 01752v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Gradient-based optimization is the workhorse of deep learning, offering efficient and scalable training via backpropagation.
By Ismail Labiad, Mathurin Videau, Matthieu Kowalski, Marc Schoenauer, Alessandro Leite, Julia Kempe, Olivier Teytaud
arXiv:2603. 00801v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Language agents increasingly act as web-enabled systems that search, browse, and synthesize information from diverse sources.
By Shrey Shah, Levent Ozgur
arXiv:2605. 31219v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: While decision-based black-box adversarial attacks present a severe security threat, current methodologies suffer from fundamental limitations.
By Ei Hmue Khine, Yao Li, Jiebao Sun, Shengzhu Shi, Zhichang Guo, Boying Wu
arXiv:2606. 15308v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: While multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have shown strong visual reasoning abilities, serving a large model for every query is computationally expensive.
By Zhongye Liu, Yaopei Zeng, Yurui Chang, Lu Lin
The paper introduces FAB, an attack that uses meta‑learning to embed dormant adversarial behaviors into large language models (LLMs). These behaviors remain inactive until the model is finetuned by downstream users, at which point the model can exhibit unwanted actions such as unsolicited advertising, jailbreakability, or over‑refusal. FAB is shown to be effective across multiple LLMs and resilient to various finetuning settings.
By Thibaud Gloaguen, Mark Vero, Robin Staab, Martin Vechev
arXiv:2607. 27386v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Diffusion Language Models (DLMs) offer a compelling alternative to autoregressive (AR) generation by enabling bidirectional context and iterative refinement.
By Saurabh Yadav, Badri Narayana Patro, Vijay Srinivas Agneeswaran
arXiv:2512. 21815v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Vision-language models (VLMs) achieve remarkable performance but remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks.
By Mengqi He, Xinyu Tian, Xin Shen, Jinhong Ni, Shu Zou, Zhaoyuan Yang, Jing Zhang
arXiv:2512. 11614v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) relies on retrieved context to guide large language models (LLM), yet treats the retrieval as a heuristic rather than verifiable evidence -- leading to unsupported answers, hallucinations, and reliance on spurious context.
By Bj\"orn Deiseroth, Max Henning H\"oth, Kristian Kersting, Letitia Parcalabescu
arXiv:2608.21606v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Machine unlearning aims to remove the influence of targeted training data from a model while preserving its remaining capabilities, but evaluating whet...
By Ayush Gupta, Hima Varshini Surisetty, Sreevidya Bollineni, Varad Ingale, Tuhina Tripathi, Abhishek Lalwani, Somya Chatterjee, Sadid Hasan
RAGSentinel is a training‑free, label‑free defense designed for black‑box retrieval‑augmented generation systems. It employs a surrogate encoder to detect hidden‑state shifts caused by retrieved documents, removes shared topic directions, and filters poisoned documents as geometric outliers from a robust majority consensus. The method is proven to recover a poison‑free majority context under honest‑majority and representation‑separation assumptions, and experiments show it keeps attack success rates low while maintaining accuracy across multiple datasets, LLM families, and adaptive attacks.
By Yueyang Quan, Anjun Gao, Yufei Xia, Minghong Fang, Zhuqing Liu
arXiv:2607. 26339v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems ground large language models (LLMs) in external corpora, but this reliance exposes them to corpus poisoning: maliciously injected passages that manipulate retrieved evidence.
By Pushkal Kumar, Tucker Nielson, Tanish Kolhe, Shubham Zala, Vincent Li