arXiv:2606. 18467v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Modern AI agents retrieve documents, call tools, check intermediate information, and then produce a final answer or action.
arXiv:2605. 12925v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Evaluation of software engineering (SWE) agents is dominated by a binary signal: whether the final patch passes the tests.
HINTBench is a new benchmark for evaluating agents’ intrinsic risk, comprising 596 trajectories (400 synthetic risky, 136 synthetic safe, 30 real risky, 30 real safe) with an average length of 24 steps. It supports three tasks—risk detection, risk-step localization, and intrinsic failure-type identification—using a unified five-constraint taxonomy. Experiments show a large performance gap: while large language models can detect risky trajectories, they score below 37 on strict-F1 for risk-step localization, and existing guard models transfer poorly to this setting.
arXiv:2605. 06890v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: AI agents are promising for high-stakes enterprise workflows, but dependable deployment remains limited because tool-use failures are difficult to diagnose and control.
arXiv:2608. 11274v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The dominant paradigm treats AI safety as a property to be instilled during model training via RLHF, DPO, or Constitutional AI.
arXiv:2604. 02022v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Evaluating the safety of LLM-based agents is increasingly important because risks in realistic deployments often emerge over multi-step interactions rather than isolated prompts or final responses.
The paper introduces ontological trust, a task‑conditioned property of trajectory prefixes, and presents RGE, an online monitor that decomposes trust into Role, Goal, and Evidence. RGE uses LLMs only for structured task and step representations, while trust updates and interventions are deterministic, producing a replayable and auditable trust trajectory. Evaluated on a cross‑domain corpus, RGE outperforms rule‑, judge‑, and shield‑style baselines, achieving over 93% Drift F1 and maintaining high benign coverage.
arXiv:2608. 12851v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Self-improving LLM agents convert successful trajectories into persistent cross-task state.
arXiv:2608. 09885v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The safety of large language model (LLM) agents depends not only on model weights but also on the agent harness that manages context, memory, tools, permissions, and runtime control.
arXiv:2602.02475v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: AI agents often fail in ways that are difficult to localize because executions are probabilistic, long-horizon, multi-agent, and mediated by noisy...
arXiv:2606. 02965v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: As large language models gain tool access and are deployed as autonomous agents capable of editing records, executing transactions, and modifying infrastructure, we still evaluate them based on the sole metric of task completion.
Software engineering (SWE) agents resolve repository-level issues through long trajectories that grow increasingly expensive as context accumulates. Failed runs tend to be longer and exhibit redundant exploration or looping, suggesting that some failures may be detectable before completion.
arXiv:2606. 29898v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Real-world evaluation is the gold standard for robot policies because it tests them against the physical conditions and deployment challenges they are ultimately designed to handle.