arXiv:2607. 11983v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A specialist tolerates blind spots that a generalist does not.
arXiv:2607. 07436v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: A self-evolving agent retires its bad skills by watching them fail, so what happens when the judge cannot see the failures?
A self-evolving agent retires its bad skills by watching them fail, so what happens when the judge cannot see the failures? Skill retirement is the structural constraint that keeps a growing library from drifting below the no-skill baseline, but its guarantee assumes an unbiased reward, which is false for the LLM judges that reference-free tasks force upon us.
arXiv:2609.07162v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Several properties safety monitors are asked to certify, among them cross-tenant noninterference, sandbagging and evaluation awareness, are 2-safety hy...
The paper demonstrates that a preference‑optimization objective can learn to distinguish reliable from unreliable sources by installing a prior‑dependent reliability switch. By training on data where a source’s stated reliability is paired with its answer, the model learns to flip its response only when the stated reliability exceeds a threshold that grows with the model’s prior. Experiments on Qwen2.5‑7B‑Instruct and Llama‑3.1‑8B show that this switch generalizes to unseen reliability values and follows stated reliability over role prestige, whereas supervised imitation fails to learn it.
arXiv:2605. 22148v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: A large language model (LLM) agent that writes and edits its own skill library must also decide which skills to keep, from one noisy scalar per skill.
arXiv:2608. 19885v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Streaming systems that maintain a pool of expert models must repeatedly decide whether to reuse an existing expert for arriving data, spawn a new one, or defer.
arXiv:2609.06036v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Proposal-based controllers---learned policies, language-model planners, and other black-box \emph{generators}---are increasingly deployed behind runtim...
arXiv:2608. 19888v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Streaming systems that maintain a pool of expert models must repeatedly decide whether to reuse an existing expert for arriving data, spawn a new one, or defer.
arXiv:2607. 11920v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Evaluating decisions made under uncertainty is hard when labeled outcomes are scarce, costly, or confounded with luck.
arXiv:2606. 15712v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We ask a structural question: given unreliable elementary problem-solvers, what organizations of them solve hard problems reliably, and what are the limits?
arXiv:2609.01345v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Inference cascades cut cost by answering most queries with a cheap model and escalating a hard tail to a frontier model that acts as verifier. A natura...
The paper examines how an agent’s probability report is evaluated twice—once by a strictly proper scoring rule and again by an approval rule that determines a decision. It shows that when the approval rule is welfare‑maximizing, it cannot be affine, yet the resulting distortion is predictable and can be mitigated by a reserve report that neutralizes the cost of pretending to be the marginal type. A Lipschitz rule with a single kink achieves first‑best welfare, while smooth rules cannot, and the key constraint is the steepness of the rule rather than its smoothness.