arXiv Machine Learning

LLM-Attack Suite: A Unified Red-Team Framework for Privacy Evaluation of Split and Distributed LLM Systems

The paper introduces LLM‑Attack Suite, a unified framework for evaluating privacy risks in split and distributed large language models. It records attacker choices—such as message types, model weights, datasets, and recovery metrics—to enable consistent comparison and extension of privacy evaluations. Experiments on GPT‑2 demonstrate that providing gradients during training significantly boosts token and document recovery rates, illustrating how attacker access levels influence privacy outcomes.

arXiv Machine Learning
Oct 19

The LLM-Attacker: A Unified Red-Team Framework for Privacy Evaluation of Split and Distributed LLM Systems

The paper introduces LLM‑Attacker, a unified framework for evaluating privacy risks in split and distributed large language models. It records attacker choices—such as message types, model weights, datasets, and recovery metrics—to enable consistent comparison and extension of privacy evaluations. Experiments on GPT‑2 show that providing training gradients boosts token recovery from 94.20% to 97.38% and exact‑document recovery from 13.71% to 37.77%, illustrating the framework’s ability to quantify how changes in attacker access affect privacy outcomes.

By Georgios Politis, Evangelos Pappas
arXiv Computation and Language
Sep 21

Conformal Privacy Auditing: Calibrated Re-identification Attacks with Statistical Guarantees

Conformal Privacy Auditing (CPA) is a distribution‑free framework that calibrates re‑identification risk for each released document against large language model (LLM)‑empowered adversaries. It outputs a conformal ambiguity set of candidate identities that is guaranteed to contain the true identity with a user‑chosen confidence level under exchangeability, along with an interpretable leakage proxy derived from the set size. CPA supports both logit‑access and sampling‑only attackers, enabling audits of both open‑source and proprietary models, and demonstrates calibrated coverage across various benchmarks and attacker configurations.

By Shuo Huang, Gholamreza Haffari, Xingliang Yuan, Ting Yu, Lizhen Qu
arXiv AI
Oct 12

LLMail-Inject: A Dataset from a Realistic Adaptive Prompt Injection Challenge

LLMail-Inject is a large-scale benchmark comprising 208,095 human-written prompt injection attacks gathered from a public red‑teaming challenge with 839 participants. The dataset tests the full attack chain—retrieving prompts from an email database, bypassing production defenses, and triggering unauthorized tool calls with correct arguments. Evaluation shows that models performing well on smaller benchmarks struggle on LLMail-Inject, with GPT‑4o achieving 58% attack success and Meta SecAlign 32%.

By Sahar Abdelnabi, Aideen Fay, Ahmed Salem, Egor Zverev, Kai-Chieh Liao, Chi-Huang Liu, Chun-Chih Kuo, Jannis Weigend, Danyael Manlangit, Alex Apostolov, Haris Umair, Jo\~ao Donato, Masayuki Kawakita, Athar Mahboob, Tran Huu Bach, Tsun-Han Chiang, Myeongjin Cho, Hajin Choi, Byeonghyeon Kim, Hyeonjin Lee, Benjamin Pannell, Conor McCauley, Mark Russinovich, Andrew Paverd, Giovanni Cherubin
arXiv Machine Learning
Jun 2

Profiling Privacy Preservation Against Gradient Inversion Attacks in Tabular Federated Learning

arXiv:2606. 00986v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Federated learning (FL) enables multiple data holders to train machine learning models collaboratively without centralizing raw data, making it useful in privacy sensitive domains such as healthcare and institutional data sharing.

By Ivo Osterberg Nilsson, Maximilian Birr Engvall, Viktor Valadi, Teddy Lazebnik
arXiv Machine Learning
Oct 2

SparLeak: Privacy Leakage from Sparse Attention in LLM Inference on Shared GPUs

The paper introduces SparLeak, a side‑channel attack that exploits a new GPU micro‑architectural leakage called Sparsity‑Induced Memory Access (SIMA) caused by sparse attention in large language models. By capturing SIMA traces during LLM inference, SparLeak can infer user‑query attributes from prefill‑phase traces and reconstruct autoregressive responses from decoding‑phase traces. Experiments on three LLM architectures, three sparse attention mechanisms, and three privacy‑sensitive datasets show high success rates (90.9% for attribute inference and 87.3% for response reconstruction), underscoring the need to address SIMA leakage in sparse‑attention deployments.

By Fahao Chen, Linkang Du, Jinhao Zhou, Peng Li, Zhou Su
arXiv Machine Learning
Jun 9

SoK: Reconstruction Attacks on Synthetic Tabular Data (Insights from Winning the NIST CRC)

arXiv:2606. 08372v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Synthetic data is increasingly promoted as a privacy-preserving substitute for releasing sensitive tabular records, yet its central adversarial threat ("reconstruction", the recovery of an individual's hidden attribute values from a synthetic release and a handful of known quasi-identifiers) has been studied only in scattered, hard-to-compare settings.

By Steven Golob, Sikha Pentyala, Martine De Cock
arXiv AI
5d ago

TextCloak: Safeguarding Data from Unauthorized LLM Fine-Tuning via RL-Driven Unlearnable Examples

TextCloak is a reinforcement‑learning driven framework that generates unlearnable examples (UEs) to protect textual data from unauthorized fine‑tuning of large language models (LLMs). It transforms clean text into perturbations that preserve meaning and naturalness while degrading the utility of models trained on them. Experiments on six datasets and nine LLMs show that TextCloak consistently impairs unauthorized fine‑tuning and remains robust across different architectures, training settings, and adaptive attacks.

By Chengshuai Zhao, Pingchuan Ma, Dawei Li, Bohan Jiang, Zhiyuan Yu, Zhen Tan, Huan Liu