arXiv:2602. 14211v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Agent skills extend LLM agents with task-specific instructions, executable scripts, and auxiliary resources, improving reusability but creating a new supply-chain attack surface.
By Xiaojun Jia, Jie Liao, Simeng Qin, Jindong Gu, Wenqi Ren, Xiaochun Cao, Yang Liu, Philip Torr
arXiv:2606. 15057v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Indirect prompt injection (IPI) is a major security threat to LLM-powered agents.
By Xinhang Ma, Taoran Li, Chaowei Xiao, Zhiyuan Yu, Ning Zhang, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik
arXiv:2607. 14611v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A growing class of agentic systems maintain persistent state across sessions through memory files, behavioral preferences, and knowledge bases.
By Soham Gadgil, David Alexander, Sai Sunku, Franziska Roesner
arXiv:2608. 09732v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agent skills are emerging as an important attack surface in LLM-based agent systems.
By Puyu Zeng, Simeng Qin, Jingzhi Li, Ju Jia, Zheli Liu, Xiaojun Jia
arXiv:2606. 12737v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) are rapidly evolving into agentic systems that interact with external tools and environments, introducing new security risks such as indirect prompt injection attacks through untrusted external sources.
By Pengfei He, Lesly Miculicich, Vishesh Sharma, Ash Fox, George Lee, Jiliang Tang, Tomas Pfister, Long T. Le
arXiv:2607. 06595v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Personal AI agents powered by large language models can reason and act using available tools to access emails, manage calendars, and push code to remote repositories, all with minimal oversight.
By George Torres, Sharad Shrestha, Satyajayant Misra
arXiv:2606. 11671v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agent skills let LLM agents reuse instructions, resources, tools, and workflows, but they also create a new place for malicious behavior to hide.
By Tu Lan, Chaowei Xiao
arXiv:2608. 15108v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model agents are increasingly connected to high-value resources such as computing infrastructure, credentials, usage budgets, identities, private knowledge, communication channels, and organizational workflows.
By Puyu Zeng, Qibing Ren
arXiv:2606. 02240v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Indirect prompt injection in tool-use agents is a concrete production threat: LLM agents read from integrations (third-party services such as Gmail, Salesforce, or Jira accessed through tool calls) whose response content the user neither writes nor controls.
By Hiskias Dingeto, Will Leeney
arXiv:2606. 15242v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Skills are becoming the capability layer through which LLM agents turn plans into actions, but their use introduces security risks such as data leakage, unauthorized operations, and tool misuse.
By Yi Xie, Jiawei Du, Yu Cheng, Jiuan Zhou, Zhaoxia Yin
arXiv:2603. 19423v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly rely on external tools (file operations, API calls, database transactions) to autonomously complete complex multi-step tasks.
By Shawn Li, Yue Zhao
arXiv:2607. 26998v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents automate penetration testing through an observation-action loop, selecting actions based on observations returned by tools.
By Ruoyu Wang, Heng Zhao, Renjie Wu, Mengnan Zhao, Zhixuan Chu, Wanyu Lin, Tianhang Zheng