arXiv AI

When Benign Inputs Lead to Severe Harms: Eliciting Unsafe Unintended Behaviors of Computer-Use Agents

arXiv:2602. 08235v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Although computer-use agents (CUAs) hold significant potential to automate increasingly complex OS workflows, they can demonstrate unsafe unintended behaviors that deviate from expected outcomes even under benign input contexts.

arXiv AI
Jun 4

What If Prompt Injection Never Left? Exploring Cross-Session Stored Prompt Injection in Agentic Systems

arXiv:2606. 04425v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Modern agentic systems transform LLMs from session-bounded assistants into stateful systems that persist and evolve shared world state across sessions through memories, filesystems, tools, and other long-lived contextual artifacts.

By Yuanbo Xie, Tianyun Liu, Yingjie Zhang, Suchen Liu, Yulin Li, Liya Su, Tingwen Liu
arXiv AI
Jun 2

SeClaw: Spec-Driven Security Task Synthesis for Evaluating Autonomous Agents

arXiv:2606. 02302v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Autonomous LLM agents increasingly operate in stateful environments where they access tools, files, memory, and external services.

By Hao Cheng, Changtao Miao, Tianle Song, Yin Wu, He Liu, Erjia Xiao, Junchi Chen, Xiaoyu Shi, Yichi Wang, Jing Yang, Taowen Wang, Jinhao Duan, Mengshu Sun, Peiyan Dong, Xuan Shen, Yang Cao, Renjing Xu, Kaidi Xu, Jindong Gu, Bo Zhang, Jize Zhang, Chenhao Lin, Philip Torr, Chao Shen
arXiv AI
Aug 10

ForesightSafety-SAGE:A Fully Automated Scenario Generation and Safety Evaluation Framework for LLM Agents

arXiv:2606. 08531v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly evolving from simple text-based interaction systems into LLM agents that can maintain memory, use tools, access external environments, and execute tasks.

By Lu Jia, Haibo Tong, Feifei Zhao, Jindong Li, Dongqi Liang, Ping Wu, Qian Zhang, Yi Zeng
arXiv AI
Jun 18

SafeClawBench: Separating Semantic, Audit-Evidence, and Sandbox Harm in Tool-Using LLM Agents

arXiv:2606. 18356v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Tool-using language-model agents introduce security failures that go beyond unsafe text: they can disclose protected objects, write persistent memory, send messages, modify databases, or trigger harmful code and tool effects.

By Yuchuan Tian, Mengyu Zheng, Haocheng Mei, Ye Yuan, Chao Xu, Xinghao Chen, Hanting Chen, Yu Wang