arXiv:2506. 07121v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Ensuring the safety and robustness of large language models (LLMs) is a fundamental challenge and a critical prerequisite for the responsible deployment of artificial intelligence.
arXiv:2608. 10171v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The rapid advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs) has facilitated their ubiquitous integration into various domains, leading to widespread adoption.
The paper introduces ReMAS, a reinforcement learning-based framework for black-box red-teaming of multi-agent systems (MAS) that fine-tunes attacker LLMs to craft adversarial prompts. ReMAS operates in two stages: a rewrite stage that refines base attack prompts to boost extraction success, and a template generation stage that builds attack templates to better invoke specific sub-agents and expose their system prompts. Experiments demonstrate that ReMAS significantly outperforms existing black-box attacks, showing high success rates and transferability across different backend LLMs and MAS structures.
The paper introduces T-MAP, a trajectory‑aware evolutionary search technique designed to red‑team large language model agents by exploiting vulnerabilities that arise during multi‑step tool execution. Unlike traditional methods that focus on harmful text, T‑MAP uses execution trajectories to generate adversarial prompts that bypass safety guardrails and achieve harmful objectives through actual tool interactions. Experiments across various Model Context Protocol environments show that T‑MAP outperforms baseline methods in attack realization rate and remains effective against advanced models such as GPT‑5.2, Gemini‑3‑Pro, Qwen3.5, and GLM‑5.
The paper introduces a new red‑teaming framework that treats adversarial dialogue with large language models as a Markov Decision Process, employing hierarchical reinforcement learning to handle sparse rewards and long‑horizon planning. By using a token‑level harm reward, the generative agent learns diverse, multi‑turn attacks that consistently uncover vulnerabilities beyond existing baselines. This approach achieves state‑of‑the‑art results and reframes LLM red‑teaming as a principled, trajectory‑based process.
arXiv:2606. 09701v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI red teaming must continually adapt to evolving attackers and defenders.
arXiv:2508. 20697v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: As large language models (LLMs) continue to grow in capability, so do the risks of harmful misuse through fine-tuning.
arXiv:2605. 00553v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large Language Model (LLM) Red-Teaming, which proactively identifies vulnerabilities of LLMs, is an essential process for ensuring safety.
arXiv:2607. 01859v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety training for large language models (LLMs) is conducted predominantly in English, leaving uncertain how well safety mechanisms generalize to low-resource languages and mixed-language code-switching.
arXiv:2603. 13026v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Prompt injection poses serious security risks to real-world LLM applications, particularly autonomous agents.
Safety training for large language models (LLMs) is conducted predominantly in English, leaving uncertain how well safety mechanisms generalize to low-resource languages and mixed-language code-switching. We show that this creates an epistemic gap in which models confidently generate harmful responses for inputs that fall outside the distribution of their safety training.
The paper introduces FlipJev, a fast black-box red-teaming method that discovers universal adversarial suffixes for typed decision models—models that output a single decision rather than free text. Using a quick query-based attack without an attacker language model, the authors tested 12 datasets and found that while Jev resists common prompt injections, their suffixes can flip confident answers within minutes, affecting 43% of unseen documents. Moreover, a single suffix generated from one task can flip 90–100% of samples in other tasks, highlighting a significant vulnerability across diverse applications.