arXiv:2607. 15861v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Moderation systems increasingly rely on external toxicity tools, but those tools are unreliable under code-mixing, transliteration, slang, and language mismatch.
By Indraveni Chebolu, Rohan Singh, Arnab Mallick, Harmesh Rana
arXiv:2604. 09544v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) undergo alignment training to avoid harmful behaviors, yet the resulting safeguards remain brittle: jailbreaks routinely bypass them, and fine-tuning on narrow domains can induce ``emergent misalignment'' that generalizes broadly.
By Hadas Orgad, Boyi Wei, Kaden Zheng, Martin Wattenberg, Peter Henderson, Seraphina Goldfarb-Tarrant, Yonatan Belinkov
The paper investigates how preference tuning—optimizing language models with explicit preference signals—behaves when applied to new domains. It systematically compares five alignment objectives and several adaptation strategies, such as target‑domain supervised fine‑tuning and pseudo‑labeling, across summarization, question‑answering helpfulness, and safety tasks. Results show that while pseudo‑labeling reduces domain‑shift degradation, it also causes mode collapse, highlighting a trade‑off between generalization and diversity.
By Constantinos Karouzos, Xingwei Tan, Nikolaos Aletras
arXiv:2608. 14577v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Frontier large language models (LLMs) safety evaluation has largely treated harmful generation as an attack outcome rather than as an object of analysis.
By Zhouyuan Ma, Yutao Wu, Hanxun Huang, Xiang Zheng, Xiao Liu, Yixin Cao, Zuxuan Wu, Xingjun Ma, Yu-Gang Jiang
arXiv:2609.37914v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Fine-tuning large language models on narrow, misaligned tasks can undo their post-training alignment and induce novel misaligned behaviors -- a pheno...
By Gon\c{c}alo Paulo, Louis Jaburi, Nora Belrose, Lucia Quirke, Stella Biderman
arXiv:2606. 19168v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: To achieve deeper safety alignment for large language models (LLMs), recent efforts have studied how to push safety interventions earlier into the pretraining stage, primarily by filtering unsafe data or rewriting it into safer forms.
By Jinhan Li, Kexian Tang, Yihan Xu, Zhuorui Ye, Kaifeng Lyu
arXiv:2602. 02498v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models can produce toxic or inappropriate text even for benign inputs, creating risks when deployed at scale.
By Baturay Saglam, Dionysis Kalogerias
arXiv:2609.36862v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Fine-tuning-as-a-service lets users adapt a safety-aligned language model to their own data, but it also creates a harmful fine-tuning attack surface...
By Muhammad Zeeshan Akram, Mufid Kamel Marican, Anvesh Reddy Yenugu, Ali Zain Kaimkhani, Minghong Fang
arXiv:2506. 10912v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Toxicity remains a leading cause of early-stage drug development failure.
By Fei Lin, Ziyang Gong, Cong Wang, Tengchao Zhang, Yonglin Tian, Yining Jiang, Ji Dai, Chao Guo, Xiaotong Yu, Xue Yang, Gen Luo, Fei-Yue Wang
arXiv:2608. 14626v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved substantial progress in safety alignment, yet their safety guarantees remain significantly weaker in low-resource and multilingual settings than in high-resource languages.
By Valdini Douglace Lemofouet, Blessing Ngozi Uzor, Paula Chikaodinaka Anyanwu, Danielle Blanche Kapsa, Sukairaj Hafiz Imam, P Sam Sahil, Abigail Oppong, Tassallah Abdullahi, Clemencia Siro, Idris Abdulmumin, Seid Muhie Yimam, Shamsuddeen Hassan Muhammad
arXiv:2607. 20447v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This paper describes our system for the EEUCA 2026 Shared Task on toxicity classification in gaming chat.
By Anmol Guragain, Marcos Estecha-Garitagoitia, Luis Fernando D'Haro Enr\'iquez, Ricardo de C\'ordoba
The paper introduces MMSAFE, a multi-layer framework designed to identify safety-degrading data in multilingual large language models. It shows that safety signals are distributed across multiple layers and only partially shared across languages, unlike the single-layer assumption used in monolingual settings. Experiments demonstrate that MMSAFE reduces harmful-response rates by 60% compared to random filtering and outperforms the best single-layer baseline across various models, languages, and safety benchmarks.
By Jiakun Li, Guowei Song, Sijia Li, Xingwei He, Hongzheng Chai, Yuan Yuan