arXiv AI

Valid Per-Field Selective Risk Control for Document Extraction: Three Failure Modes, a Validity Ladder, and When Conditioning Pays

arXiv:2608. 14639v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Per-field accept/review with selective risk at most alpha -- accept a field only if the error rate among accepted fields is controlled -- is the trust contract document-extraction systems need, and the natural procedure silently violates it on real documents.

arXiv AI
Sep 1

Benchmark Contamination: A Taxonomy Organized by Defeated Mitigation

The paper introduces a new taxonomy for benchmark contamination that categorizes leakage by the mitigation it defeats—direct, derivative, temporal, distributional, and acquired—covering both training‑time and evaluation‑time scenarios. It proposes a four‑field disclosure protocol to record contamination status alongside benchmark scores, and provides a JSON schema, validator, and examples. An empirical study of 41 documents using a pre‑registered instrument shows limited reporting of contamination types and variable reliability, highlighting gaps in current disclosure practices.

By Johanna Angulo, V\'ictor Yeste, Hector Espinos-Morato
arXiv Machine Learning
Aug 11

Quality-Diversity Stress Tests for Process Reward Models:What Archive Coverage Can and Cannot Certify

arXiv:2608. 08008v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Process reward models (PRMs) score intermediate reasoning steps and are widely used for search, ranking, and training, but optimization can exploit these learned proxies by increasing reward while turning correct reasoning into incorrect reasoning.

By Ibne Farabi Shihab, Fariya Afrin
arXiv Computation and Language
6d ago

Auditing and Repairing LLM-as-Judge Failures in a Production Text-to-SQL Pipeline

The paper evaluates a production text‑to‑SQL pipeline that uses an LLM as a judge, finding that the deployed gpt‑4o‑mini judge agrees with human annotators only weakly (Cohen’s kappa 0.04 on a disagreement‑enriched set and 0.42 on a random spot‑check). The authors identify a specific failure mode, GRADE‑HALLUCINATION, responsible for most over‑flags, and demonstrate that a self‑hosted Qwen3.6‑27B model achieves substantially higher agreement (kappa 0.72) at a much lower cost. They also show that ensembling judges does not improve performance, and that their audit method flags a significant portion of out‑of‑domain SQLs as potential issues.

By Haowei Liu, Hsin-Tai Wu, Yi Fang
arXiv AI
Aug 28

TriShieldRAG: 3 Rings, One Blind Spot in Layered Defenses for Retrieval-Augmented Generation

TriShieldRAG introduces a three‑layered defense for Retrieval‑Augmented Generation: an Ingest Guard that screens documents, a Retrieval Scorer that re‑ranks based on trust, and a Cross‑LLM Consensus that validates evidence across three models. Against the original PoisonedRAG attack on the 2.68M‑passage Natural Questions corpus, the framework reduces attack success from about 79% to 1%. However, adaptive attacks that only alter document formatting can bypass the Ingest Guard and still achieve high success rates, revealing limits of layered defenses that rely on the same retrieved evidence.

By Susil Kumar Mohanty, Rohit Patel, Kosuru Yuvaraj, Jeenal Chaudhary, Disha Singhania
arXiv AI
Sep 2

Counterfactual Fragility Certificates: Exposing High-Confidence Brittleness under Structured Evidence Failure

The paper introduces Counterfactual Fragility Certificates (CFC), a model‑agnostic audit protocol that maps each prediction to an evidence‑failure trajectory, summarizing it with metrics such as greedy flip budget, margin‑collapse area, degradation thresholds, and fragility dominance score. CFC is shown to identify brittle high‑confidence predictions on seven tabular benchmarks with an AUROC of 0.915, outperforming existing scalar scores by up to +0.405. The method remains effective across various perturbation and review‑budget scenarios, and can also inform fragility‑aware regularization and temperature correction.

By Filippo Cenacchi, Longbing Cao, Runze Yang