The paper investigates poisoning-based backdoor attacks on Speech Emotion Recognition (SER) systems that use self‑supervised acoustic representations. It introduces a stealthy, low‑energy acoustic trigger that can be embedded imperceptibly into both natural and synthetic speech, enabling scalable poisoning. Experiments show high attack success rates with low poisoning ratios, cross‑model transferability, and a particular vulnerability of self‑supervised representations, highlighting the lowered barrier to effective backdoor attacks via TTS technology.
arXiv:2607. 01702v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Recently, speech classification methods have gained widespread adoption in intelligent gadgets.
Recently, speech classification methods have gained widespread adoption in intelligent gadgets. Current study indicates that backdoor attacks provide a substantial security concern to these models, underscoring the pressing necessity to investigate additional potential attack techniques to expose and prevent such risks.
arXiv:2607. 15697v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Backdoor attacks pose a critical threat to neural network models, allowing attackers to implant a backdoor during the training phase by manipulating a small portion of the training data.
arXiv:2607. 15724v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: With the rapid development of deep learning, its vulnerability has gradually emerged in recent years.
arXiv:2610.09819v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Acoustic foundation models (AFMs) have democratized acoustic applications, enabling powerful models for tasks ranging from speech recognition to spea...
arXiv:2606. 05678v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Automatic speech recognition (ASR) systems have become widely used for multilingual speech-to-text transcription.
The paper introduces an adaptive jailbreak attack framework that evaluates both cascaded pipelines and end‑to‑end large audio‑language models (LALMs) under a unified setting. It employs a feedback‑guided mutation engine to automatically generate and refine jailbreak candidates across textual prompts and audio perturbations, thereby broadening attack diversity. Experiments on six audio‑based systems show that both paradigms remain highly vulnerable, with the framework achieving higher attack success rates than existing methods.
arXiv:2607. 01729v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Deep learning models for speech classification are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where malicious triggers cause misclassification at inference time.
arXiv:2610.27210v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Speech models are increasingly used as an interface to AI systems, from transcription tools to voice agents. Existing audio backdoors require an attack...
The paper introduces the Spectral Masking and Interpolation Attack (SMIA), a black‑box adversarial technique that subtly alters inaudible frequency regions of AI‑generated audio to fool voice authentication systems and their countermeasures. Experiments show SMIA achieves at least 82% success against combined verification and countermeasure systems, 97.5% against standalone speaker verification, and 100% against countermeasures, revealing a critical security gap. The authors argue that current static defenses are inadequate and call for dynamic, context‑aware defenses that can adapt to evolving threats.
The paper reviews how voice authentication has evolved from handcrafted acoustic features to deep learning speaker embeddings, expanding its use in finance, smart devices, and law enforcement. It surveys modern threats—including data poisoning, adversarial, deepfake, and adversarial spoofing attacks—tracing their development alongside technological advances. For each attack type, the authors summarize methods, datasets, performance, and limitations, and organize the literature using accepted taxonomies to highlight emerging risks and open challenges.
UniGuardian is a training‑free detector for large language models that jointly identifies prompt injection, backdoor, and adversarial attacks—collectively called Prompt Trigger Attacks (PTA). It measures how structured prompt perturbations shift the model’s output distribution and uses a single‑forward strategy to detect attacks while generating text in a shared batched forward pass. Experiments show that UniGuardian accurately and efficiently identifies trigger‑activated prompts in LLMs.