arXiv:2609.06346v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Continual learning (CL) enables models to acquire new knowledge from sequentially arriving tasks while retaining previously learned knowledge. However,...
By Keyu Lin, Fei Ye, Qihe Liu, Shijie Zhou, Jiguo Yu
arXiv:2511. 11439v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Binary security has increasingly relied on deep learning to reason about malware behavior and program semantics.
By Yiling He, Junchi Lei, Hongyu She, Shuo Shao, Xinran Zheng, Yiping Liu, Zhan Qin, Lorenzo Cavallaro
arXiv:2507. 18313v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Malware evolves rapidly, forcing machine learning-based detectors to be continuously updated.
By Daniele Ghiani, Daniele Angioni, Giorgio Piras, Angelo Sotgiu, Luca Minnei, Srishti Gupta, Maura Pintor, Fabio Roli, Battista Biggio
arXiv:2605. 24903v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Machine learning based malware detectors become obsolete over time due to concept drift in benign and malware applications.
By Suresh Kumar Amalapuram, Bikraj Shresta, Siva Ram murthy Chebiyam, Bheemarjuna Reddy Tamma, Sumohana S Channappayya
arXiv:2610.01949v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Ransomware has emerged as a major cybersecurity threat, with incidents increasing in frequency and impact across critical sectors. These attacks are...
By Emmanuela Andam, Yasir Abbas Zaidi, Abdelali Hadir, Emmanuel Grant, Naima Kaabouch
arXiv:2610.19968v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Federated fine-tuning enables large language models (LLMs) to learn collaboratively from distributed client data, but malicious client updates can comp...
By Shuaijie Ma, Yongkang Hu, Yu Cheng, Jiuan Zhou, Yi Xie, Yushuo Zhang, Zhaoxia Yin
arXiv:2601. 12359v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Prompt injection attacks have become an increasing vulnerability for LLM applications, where adversarial prompts exploit indirect input channels such as emails or user-generated content to circumvent alignment safeguards and induce harmful or unintended outputs.
By Anirudh Sekar, Mrinal Agarwal, Rachel Sharma, Akitsugu Tanaka, Jasmine Zhang, Arjun Damerla, Kevin Zhu
arXiv:2608. 13465v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Concept drift refers to changes over time in the statistical properties of data, as compared to the data that was used to train a learning model.
By Christofer Washington Berruz Chungata, Martin Jurecek, Katerina Potika, William B. Andreopoulos, Mark Stamp
MiST (Mid-trained Security Transformer) is a suite of 8B and 32B language models tailored for cybersecurity, achieving strong performance on public benchmarks. The approach uses a mid-training stage that adapts general pre-trained models to the domain by curating a compact, expert-vetted seed corpus and generating high-quality synthetic training data, rather than continual pre-training on large raw text. MiST checkpoints improve mean cybersecurity accuracy by +13.1 and +8.6 absolute percentage points over Qwen baselines for 8B and 32B models, respectively, and provide a stronger initialization for downstream task-specific fine-tuning and reinforcement learning.
By Oded Ovadia, Elad Ben Zaken, Elad Guttman, Orly Moreno Kadosh
arXiv:2606. 30572v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Malware classification remains a challenging problem due to its inherent heterogeneity, the presence of packed binaries, and the diverse distribution of malware families.
By Jithin S., Roshin Sleeba C., Anvin Mariya P. B., Asmitha K. A., Vinod P., Serena Nicolazzo, Antonino Nocera
arXiv:2608. 00732v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Backdoor attacks pose a serious threat to deep neural networks, especially when training relies on third-party data, allowing adversaries to inject malicious behaviors through data poisoning.
By Zixuan Zhu, Rui Wang, Lihua Jing, Jinwen Zhong
The paper introduces Fed-ADR, a coordinated attack framework where a malicious orchestrator server directs heterogeneous adversarial clients to adapt their gradient updates in real time, thereby evading existing federated learning defenses and drastically reducing global model accuracy. It also presents a lightweight detection mechanism that estimates true client gradients from historical data to spot coordinated attacks, and an in-situ recovery method that restores model performance without restarting training. Experiments on MNIST, Fashion‑MNIST, and CIFAR‑10 show the attack can drop accuracy from over 90% to below 10%, while the defense can recover accuracy to above 90% within a few rounds at a computational cost at least 20× lower than retraining from scratch.
By Mohamed Shaaban, Ahmed Abdelnaby, Mohamed Elmahallawy