arXiv:2606. 00826v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Strategic machine learning investigates scenarios where agents manipulate their features to receive favorable decisions from predictive models.
By Xinpeng Lv, Chunyuan Zheng, Yunxin Mao, Renzhe Xu, Hao Zou, Shanzhi Gu, Liyang Xu, Huan Chen, Yuanlong Chen, Wenjing Yang, Haotian Wang
arXiv:2605. 19674v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Strategic classification(SC) studies the interaction between decision models and agents who strategically manipulate their features for favorable outcomes.
By Xinpeng Lv, Yunxin Mao, Renzhe Xu, Chunyuan Zheng, Yikai Chen, Haoxuan Li, Yang Shi, Jinxuan Yang, Zhouchen Lin, Yuanlong Chen, Yuanxing Zhang, Shaowu Yang, Wenjing Yang, Haotian Wang
arXiv:2511. 04500v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as decision-making agents in high-stakes domains and as imitators of human behavior in the social and behavioral sciences.
By Andrea Cera Palatsi, Samuel Martin-Gutierrez, Ana S. Cardenal, Max Pellert
arXiv:2509. 23102v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) has emerged as the standard paradigm for aligning large language models with human preferences.
By Fang Wu, Xu Huang, Weihao Xuan, Zhiwei Zhang, Yijia Xiao, Guancheng Wan, Xiaomin Li, Bing Hu, Peng Xia, Jure Leskovec, Yejin Choi
arXiv:2609.01595v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: We develop a framework for mechanism design with AI agents whose alignment (preferences) and capabilities (feasible actions and information) are unkn...
By Dirk Bergemann, Andrew Koh, Stephen Morris
The paper introduces Preference-based Opponent Shaping (PBOS), a method that incorporates a preference parameter into an agent’s loss function to directly consider an opponent’s loss during strategy updates. By jointly learning strategy and preference parameters, PBOS aims to guide agents toward cooperative or competitive behaviors without relying on simple opponent predictions. Experiments on differentiable games demonstrate that PBOS enables agents to achieve better reward distributions across various environments.
By Xinyu Qiao, Yudong Hu, Congying Han, Weiyan Wu, Tiande Guo
arXiv:2607. 09993v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Adversarial team games (ATGs) with asymmetric information, such as adversarial path-finding, goal search, and reachability games on graphs, require strategies that are robust to hidden opponent types, such as a hidden goal flag, and to deception.
By Naman Aggarwal, Jonathan P. How
The paper presents UBCL, a reinforcement learning framework that generates controllable and diverse player behaviors without using human gameplay data. By defining behavior in an N‑dimensional continuous space and training a single PPO‑based multi‑agent policy with target behavior vectors, the method learns how actions affect behavioral statistics such as aggressiveness, mobility, and cooperativeness. Experiments in a custom Unity multiplayer game demonstrate that UBCL achieves greater behavioral diversity than a win‑only baseline and accurately matches specified behavior vectors across a range of targets.
By Atahan Cilan, Atay \"Ozg\"ovde
arXiv:2607. 00155v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study runtime human oversight of an AI agent when private information runs in both directions: the human privately knows her reward function, while the AI privately knows the quality of the action it proposes.
By Yunjin Tong
arXiv:2606. 30136v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Humans facing algorithmic decision systems have been found to ``game'' them by altering their input data (at a cost to them) in order to favorably change the algorithmic outcomes they receive (at a cost to the algorithm).
By Sura Alhanouti, G\"uzin Bayraksan, Parinaz Naghizadeh
arXiv:2608. 20016v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Reputation is widely recognized as a key mechanism for sustaining cooperation.
By Chenyang Zhao, Jiqiang Zhang, Li Chen, Yong Zou
arXiv:2606. 11284v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Real-world multi-agent systems, from traffic coordination to resource allocation, are often modeled as general-sum games where individual incentives conflict with collective welfare.
By Wongyu Lee, Francesco Lelli, Omran Ayoub, Massimo Tornatore