arXiv:2607. 19292v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Current AI safety discourse still focuses disproportionately on visible failures, including obvious harms, dramatic misuse, and hypothetical catastrophic scenarios.
arXiv:2607. 18366v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) serving as planners in tool-using autonomous agents introduce dynamic reliability risks in multi-turn execution.
arXiv:2609.16305v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly operate over long-horizon interactions involving tool use, persistent state, evolving authorization, and...
arXiv:2609. 11030v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI agents increasingly act through tools and delegated authority, but general incident repositories rarely capture the mechanisms needed to compare public failures with agent-security evaluations.
The study evaluates how large language model agents maintain consistency over extended interactions by simulating a 20‑step delayed‑gratification task. Researchers ran 84,540 trajectories across eight model families, using survival analysis to track when agents first claim a reward and discrete‑time hazard regression to assess how factors like social visibility, persona stressors, and deliberation policy affect failure risk. They also developed a seven‑category taxonomy from 13,780 deliberation traces, revealing that early failures are impulse‑driven, later ones are fatigue‑ or cost‑benefit‑framed, and public settings elicit norm‑oriented justifications; longer deliberation correlates with higher intra‑rationale contradictions, challenging assumptions about reasoning depth and consistency.
arXiv:2410. 22526v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: To effectively address potential harms from Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems, it is essential to identify and mitigate system-level hazards.
arXiv:2607. 29405v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agentic AI systems act through multi-step trajectories that combine planning, tool use, memory, interaction, and adaptation.
arXiv:2608. 11274v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The dominant paradigm treats AI safety as a property to be instilled during model training via RLHF, DPO, or Constitutional AI.
arXiv:2606. 14589v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM agent systems increasingly run as long-lived autonomous runtimes: scheduling jobs, calling tools, maintaining memory, and pushing results to humans.
Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly operate over long-horizon interactions involving tool use, persistent state, evolving authorization, and external environment feedback. In such settings,...
arXiv:2606. 02965v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Benchmarks for autonomous agents measure whether agents complete tasks, yet this framing is systematically blind to whether an agent should have proceeded at all.
AI agents increasingly act through tools and delegated authority, but general incident repositories rarely capture the mechanisms needed to compare public failures with agent-security evaluations. We...