arXiv:2607. 29405v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agentic AI systems act through multi-step trajectories that combine planning, tool use, memory, interaction, and adaptation.
arXiv:2607. 01793v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM agents increasingly perform autonomous actions through external tools, leading to complex and evolving safety risks.
arXiv:2607. 18548v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agentic artificial intelligence systems, capable of autonomous perception, planning, tool use, and multi-step action, are increasingly proposed for critical engineering domains where decisions carry physical, operational, or economic consequences.
arXiv:2606. 18532v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI systems are increasingly evaluated in bounded environments that combine isolation, simulation, instrumentation, supervision, and evidence capture.
arXiv:2410. 22526v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: To effectively address potential harms from Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems, it is essential to identify and mitigate system-level hazards.
The paper reviews how large language models have evolved into agents that can influence external environments through tool use, interface operation, delegation, state retention, virtual world inhabitation, and robotic control. It critiques the narrative of a single march toward autonomy, distinguishing model competence from system integration, persistence, and safe authority. The authors find that action-interface expansion is well documented, while robust completion, recovery, authorization, and independent verification remain less proven, and they propose a framework of justified delegation to guide future research.
arXiv:2607. 14275v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Context engineering has become central to building reliable AI agents, yet it remains largely unmeasured.
The paper presents a diagnostic study of a multi‑stage LLM‑based cyber agent system, examining its orchestrator, executor, and validator components in enterprise‑style lateral‑movement scenarios. Six advanced LLMs were tested across expert‑defined, self‑scaffolded, and fully autonomous modes, with metrics that include validator consistency, evidence grounding, token usage, retries, and runtime. Findings show that while validators are generally relevant, they are often nonspecific and overly optimistic, and the main bottlenecks lie in credential acquisition and lateral‑movement tasks, especially under full autonomy.
arXiv:2605. 12729v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models are increasingly being used to support network operations (NetOps) and artificial intelligence for IT operations (AIOps), including incident investigation, root-cause analysis, configuration synthesis, and limited self-healing.
The paper examines how agentic AI systems intended for military command and control are tested and evaluated. It reviews 240 testing practices across eight dimensions and three lifecycle stages, uncovering eight assumptions—grouped into system specifiability, stability, composability, and supervisability—whose validity is weakened by agentic properties. Consequently, test results may meet procedural standards but do not guarantee that fielded behavior matches tested behavior, leading the authors to propose ten assurance claims and suggest that uncertainty be managed through deployment‑time monitoring and defined expiry conditions.
arXiv:2607. 19292v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Current AI safety discourse still focuses disproportionately on visible failures, including obvious harms, dramatic misuse, and hypothetical catastrophic scenarios.
arXiv:2608. 13867v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI coding agents are commonly evaluated as models but deployed as systems.
arXiv:2607. 03510v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Enterprise artificial intelligence is moving from experimentation into operational workflows.