arXiv:2606. 10173v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As AI systems move into operating systems, privacy no longer turns only on whether a model runs locally.
The paper presents RuntimeGuard‑AI, a prototype that links each deterministic AI policy decision to its source code, writes a privacy‑minimizing record at a chosen synchronization point, and returns an Ed25519‑signed receipt indicating whether the write succeeded. After a crash, the system validates the integrity of records, manifests, shard placement, sequence continuity, and replay identity, while an independent attestation path chains committed records into signed Merkle epochs for auditor verification. Performance results on an Apple M4 Pro show high throughput (up to 27,193 requests/s) with low latency when buffering, but throughput drops and latency rises when per‑record data and full synchronization are used, illustrating a clear durability‑latency trade‑off.
arXiv:2608.31142v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The 2025--2026 AI market has seen a wave of stealth releases: frontier models launched anonymously on developer platforms under codenames. For their...
arXiv:2608. 02774v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI verification crosses a trust boundary: a verifier must learn enough to establish an authorized claim, yet the same evidence can reveal sensitive details about the model, workload, or hardware.
arXiv:2606. 00152v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM-based agents are rapidly advancing, autonomously invoking external tools to complete multi-step tasks for users.
The paper proposes the Analytical Memory Unit (AMU), a memory schema that attaches a full derivation (lineage) graph to every cached result in enterprise AI agents. By gating retrieval with a policy that requires authorization for every column touched, the authors prove that sensitive columns cannot be leaked through derived results, achieving up to 90% lineage completeness to eliminate leakage. Experiments show lineage‑gated retrieval removes 18.8‑25.5% of cross‑department leakage while maintaining 81.5‑82.6% memory reuse with minimal overhead, and a real‑agent proof‑of‑concept demonstrates zero leaks over multiple interactions.
The paper introduces ASLEval, a framework for measuring privacy exposure displacement in large language model (LLM) agent sessions. It highlights that traditional local proxies—such as inspecting a single action or final response—often miss unauthorized data leaks elsewhere in a multi-step session. ASLEval pre-registers hidden target sets, tracks all declared visible exits, and preserves internal traces for diagnosis, revealing that a single outlet view can overlook nearly 47% of exposure and that internal evidence typically precedes visible leaks. The study underscores the need for benchmarks that define complete visible boundaries, ground claims in pre-specified targets, and report privacy alongside task utility.
arXiv:2606. 04990v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM)-based agents increasingly solve complex tasks by interacting with external tools, retrieval systems, memory modules, environments, and other agents.
Shared memory helps language-model agents reuse information across long workflows, yet relevant evidence may not be admissible for a particular agent or action. Because restrictions propagate through derivations, summaries can conceal private, poisoned, untrusted, or revoked sources, enabling unauthorized reads or unsafe actions.
arXiv:2608. 10509v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Shared memory helps language-model agents reuse information across long workflows, yet relevant evidence may not be admissible for a particular agent or action.
The paper discusses how large language model agents now act as privileged principals with kernel‑grade authority, yet lack the trusted mediation traditionally required for operating‑system security. It introduces a taxonomy that distinguishes between provenance‑based deterministic checks and content‑semantic checks, identifying a central mediation gap in distinguishing data from instruction and authorized from unauthorized actions. The authors argue that this gap creates an irreducible risk of undetected attacks whenever inputs and actions are not pre‑enumerated, and they propose defenses across runtime monitoring, architectural separation, and authorization while critiquing current evaluation practices. They extend the analysis to AI‑native operating systems where the model itself serves as the arbitration core, outlining design constraints, challenges, and a research agenda.
arXiv:2607. 25364v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Tool-using agents expose structured calls but commonly attach free-form rationales.