arXiv:2608. 10509v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Shared memory helps language-model agents reuse information across long workflows, yet relevant evidence may not be admissible for a particular agent or action.
By Yiqi Wang, Zihao Yan, Jiaqi Zhang, Zhangkai Wu, Mingkai Zheng, Zequn Sun, Yanming Zhu, Taotao Cai
arXiv:2606. 04990v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM)-based agents increasingly solve complex tasks by interacting with external tools, retrieval systems, memory modules, environments, and other agents.
By Yiqi Wang, Jiaqi Zhang, Taotao Cai, Zirui Liu, Qingqiang Sun, Zequn Sun, Zhangkai Wu, Mingkai Zhang, Yanming Zhu
arXiv:2606. 04990v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM)-based agents are evolving from passive text generators into autonomous systems capable of planning, tool use, retrieval, memory access, environmental interaction, and multi-agent collaboration.
By Yiqi Wang, Jiaqi Zhang, Taotao Cai, Zirui Liu, Qingqiang Sun, Zequn Sun, Zhangkai Wu, Manqing Dong, Mingkai Zhang, Xuefei Yin, Yanming Zhu
LEDGER is a tracing and review system for large language model agents that constructs layered trace graphs from observed sessions. It groups raw trace records into Evidence Nodes and Workflow Nodes, anchors artifacts as evidence, and adds typed semantic edges linking claims to supporting actions, artifacts, and checks. The resulting traces reveal workflow decisions, artifact lineage, repair steps, validation coverage, and claim‑support paths for evidence‑centered audit.
By Daehong Kim, Haichao Miao, Shusen Liu
The paper introduces PACE, a Provenance-Aware Capability Enforcement system designed to secure tool-using large language model agents by mediating every tool call before execution. PACE employs path confinement to limit influence paths and verifies effects against authenticated authority, distinguishing certified execution contracts from evaluated configurations. Experiments on eight agent‑security benchmarks show that the evaluated configuration reduces attack success in most cases while maintaining near‑native utility.
By Fengpeng Li, Qizhou Wang, Yuke Hu, Kemou Li, Jun Liu, Haiwei Wu, Jiantao Zhou, Di Wang
arXiv:2607. 29167v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Long-term memory lets large language model(LLM) agents reuse prior preferences and work flows, but it also turns untrusted observations into persistent action context.
By Jinghan Xu, Yiyong Xiao, Wanru Shao, Hankai Liu, Xinjin Li
arXiv:2608. 05204v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM-agent ecosystems are rapidly growing around reusable skills: mixed-modality packages of metadata, natural-language instructions, code, tools, references, and operational workflows.
By Jialuo Chen, Minghe Wang, Lingqi Jiang, Jianan Ma, Xinhao Deng, Xiaohu Du, Ruixiao Lin, Yunhao Feng, Linkang Du, Jingyi Wang
arXiv:2607. 24563v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Security Operations Centers increasingly rely on automated mapping of Cyber Threat Intelligence reports to MITRE ATT&CK, yet extractor outputs remain fallible and are often stored without the evidence, provenance, and validation history needed to decide whether an individual mapping should be trusted.
By Federico Valletta, Giacomo Longo, Enrico Russo, Alessio Merlo
The paper introduces SARA, a framework that separates action induction from runtime authorization in tool‑augmented LLM agents. By treating these as distinct roles, SARA uses an Action Probe to record action provenance and only authorizes tool calls that align with the user objective and past successful executions. Experiments on AgentDojo and AgentDyn show that SARA reduces action‑to‑side‑effect risk to below 0.63% while preserving task performance.
By Xiaokun Guo, Zhen Xu, Dongdong Huo, Yanqiu Zhang, Wei Wang, Qinfu Yang, Dongjin Yu, Yu Wang
arXiv:2606. 09084v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Tool-using LLM agents interact with the world through actions that persist state in artifacts (e.
By Xiaofeng Lin, Yukai Yang, Daniel Guo, Sahil Arun Nale, Charles Fleming, Guang Cheng
The paper introduces a claim‑anchored execution contract that binds a tool‑using agent’s emitted claim to its exact source span, the ordered execution prefix that produced it, and the source version and access state observed. Each receipt contains deterministic anchors, source identifiers, offsets, hashes, quotes, and a domain‑separated execution commitment, allowing a verifier to reconstruct these bindings before semantic or task labels are joined. The contract defines seven independently testable properties and demonstrates high detection rates against cross‑object attacks, with strong performance on conflict‑aware support guard evaluations.
By Miaobo Hu, Shuhao Hu, Xiaobo Guo, Xin Wang, Bokun Wang, Yina Sa, Daren Zha, Jun Xiao
arXiv:2607. 18816v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM-powered agents increasingly tackle complex tasks by invoking tools, querying databases, executing code, and manipulating intermediate artifacts.
By Eden Wu, Sonia Castelo, Yurong Liu, Cl\'audio T. Silva, Juliana Freire